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BIOTECHNOLOGY - A BIOETHICAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMA
L INTRODUCTION
The science fiction of yesterday is the reality of today - the
cloning process, which was just a fanciful idea leaping from the mind
of an inventive author, is now almost routine laboratory procedure
in the genetic engineering sphere.1 Even as the nuclear clock is set
at five minutes to midnight, we have now entered the era of genetic
engineering with its tremendous potential for effecting many changes
in our outlook on life, arising out of the awesome control we have
acquired over nature.' In a relatively short period of time, we have
rapidly progressed from the nuclear age to the electronic age and
into the "gene age."3  This scientific revolution, based on "novel
biological techniques,"4 has prompted legal and ethical concerns
1. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE SOCIAL AND
ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENEIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 8-9 (1982) [hereinafter
SPLICING LIFE]. The term "genetic engineering" encompasses the varied techniques and
procedures used by scientists to alter genetic material. Id. at 8. Cloning, one of these
techniques, refers to the production of genetically exact duplicates and is applicable to cells
or entire organisms. (Identical twins are an example of cloning found in nature.) Id. Humans
have practiced the art of "engineering" by the use of selective breeding procedures to obtain
domestic animals and plants with desired characteristics. Id. Using today's sophisticated
technology, selective breeding can be replaced by the faster technique of direct manipulation
of the genetic material. Id. at 9.
2. This time-setting by nuclear scientists serves to remind the world of the terrifying
implications of the misuse of nuclear power and its destructiveness. This warning can be
transposed to the technological advances made in the field of genetics, which have put another
powerful tool in the hands of humanity. Milunsky & Annas, Preface to GENEICS AND THE
LAW III at xv (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1985) [hereinafter GENEICS III]. The "new
genetics" has been compared to the discovery of fire and its accompanying societal problems;
it has been referred to as the "metaphorical fire" which is both "the blessing and the curse."
Id.
3. E. SYLVESTER & L. KLoTZ, THE GENE AGE (rev. ed. 1987). The authors regard this
new age as the "hearth of the next industrial revolution," id. at 2; "the era of the high-tech
entrepreneur" growing out of the "fusion of pure science and business, of laboratory and
market." Id. at 3.
4. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
2, BACKGROUND PAPER, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, OTA-BA 3 (1987)
(standing on "the brink of a new scientific revolution" that will have great impact on the
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among scientists and the general public.
The questions posed range from the application of gene
therapy to genetic diseases,5 property rights in the original human
tissues (including fetal cells) used in the development of a cell line,6
fetal transplants,' genetic screening in the workplace,8 genetic
counseling and the liability of the medical practitioner,9 and
applicability in forensic science" to constitutional implications."1
Additionally, because of the fears of the unknown risks'"which this
American public. Id. at 5.). The survey detailed in this report indicated that, despite the
concern, the majority felt the potential benefits of biotechnology outbalance the risks. Id.
5. Id. at 69.
6. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
1, BACKGROUND PAPER, OWNERSHIP OF HuMN TISSUES AND CELLS, OTA-BA-337, 49 (1987)
[hereinafter OWNERSHIP OF CELLS]. Commercial interest in human materials has expanded
due to the profitability of new inventions in biotechnology. The three main interested groups
are the human tissue donors, researchers, and the biotechnology firms. Id. at 49.
7. Nightline: Fetal Transplants (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 6, 1988) (transcript No.
1728). In an interview with a fetal transplant researcher, the ethical ramifications of fetal
transplants were addressed. The researcher concluded that no answers were currently
available. Id. at 5-6.
8. Matthewman, Title 1,71 and Genetic Testing: Can Your Genes Screen You Out of a Job?,
27 How. L. 1185 (1984). As a result of advanced technology, employers may now utilize
genetic testing to screen out high risk individuals such as people who are genetically
predisposed to certain diseases or are susceptible to toxins in the workplace. Id. at 1187.
9. Milunsky, Prenatal Diagnosis: New Tools, New Problems, in GENETICS III, supra note
2, at 335. The failure of physicians to counsel prospective parents about potential genetic
disorders in the unborn fetus has resulted in many lawsuits where children have been born
with genetic defects that could have been prevented. Id.
10. Lohr, For Crime Detection, 'Genetic Fingerprinting', N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1987, at A9,
col. 1. In Great Britain, a defendant was convicted for rape based on evidence of "genetic
fingerprinting." Id. By using this technique, the semen stain on the victim's clothes was
found to match the genetic pattern in the blood of the subsequently convicted rapist. Id.
See also Johnson, Lab Dispute Delays Chambers Trial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at B3, col.
2. This procedure, which has been accepted in English courts, has not yet been used in
American criminal cases. In a recent New York case, evidence was introduced to prove that
a sample of saliva on the victim's clothing was a genetic match of the defendant. People v.
Chambers, 134 Misc. 2d 688, 512 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1987). Widely accepted legal
admissibility of this evidence is yet to be determined. Johnson, supra, at col. 3.
11. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
CONS ITrr ION, BACKGROUND PAPER, OTA-BP-CIT-43 (1987) [hereinafter CONSITUTION].
12. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental
Rationality, in BIOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 1 (M. Shapiro ed.
1982). Professor Tribe has commented "the emerging pattern has been unmistakable: an
increasingly shared sense that our society's technological capabilities have moved out of phase
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new technology may bring, attention will have to be focused on the
regulatory processes instituted by Congress."a The rights of the
scientific researcher and the biotechnical industry to protect the
fruits of their labor also merit consideration. Is the protection to be
found in the intellectual property law of patents, trade secrets, or
copyrights? 4 There are "many questions, few definitive answers,""
but much food for thought.
I. BACKGROUND
Broadly defined, biotechnology refers to biological systems and
organisms as applied in technical and industrial methodology. 6 The
sophisticated genetic technology of today has its scientific base in
the experimentation performed by Gregor Mendel, which led to the
identification of the gene as the "vehicle and repository of the
with our capacity to understand and direct their development, to humanize and contain their
impact, and to integrate their evolution with our cultural and natural lives." Id. at 4.
Professor Tribe questions the wisdom of developing "certain techniques of genetic engineering"
such as asexual reproduction and neurological manipulation. Id. at 19. He expresses the fear
that the pursuit of such technology may present a "fundamental threat to the concept of the
reality of the human being as a unique and intrinsically valuable entity." Id. at 23.
See Ozonoff, Just Wen You Thought It Was Safe: An Update on the Risks of Recombinant
DNA Technology, in GENETICS III, supra note 2, at 467. One of the prime concerns generated
by this new technology is the creation of a new organism with unpredictable characteristics
that could cause irreparable harm to human health or to the environment. Id. at 469.
13. Gage, Government Regulation of Human Gene Therapy, 27 JURIMETRiCS J. 200 (1987).
The government regulation of biotechnology in general and the regulation of gene therapy
specifically is still only in the proposal stage. Several committees have been proposed to
advise as to the acceptability of specific research procedures. Id. at 205-07. Several
established federal agencies have been suggested for involvement in the overseeing of gene
therapy. Id. at 210-12. The final regulatory scheme is still not available. Id. at 212.
14. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 70, 71, 78. See also Weber, Biotechnolog
Firms Grid for Clash Over Patent Claims, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Dec. 10, 1984, at
18. There has been a great increase in the number of biotechnology related patent
applications, with the amount growing each year, according to the United States International
Trade Commission. Id. It is also to be expected that there will be more and more suits
involving patent claims; with many firms seeking to produce the same products, the
biotechnology industry "will be a very litigious one in the years to come." Id.
15. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 3.
16. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,854, 50,906 (1984).
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hereditary mechanism."" The work begun by Mendel has been
vastly expanded through the extensive scientific research and
experimentation conducted within the past few decades."8
In the early 1940s, research scientists proved that the gene was
made up of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)."' Then, in 1953, the
double helix structure of the DNA molecule was uncovered by
James Watson and Francis Crick by utilizing X-ray crystallographic
techniques.' The scientific community was very receptive to the
Watson-Crick finding since it "implied how DNA worked."2 The
scientists in the laboratory now possessed a structure model' from
17. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPUED GENEICS (1980)
[hereinafter IMPACTS]. In the mid-nineteenth century, Gregor Mendel, an Austrian monk,
determined from his analysis of controlled crosses between sweet pea plants that each
inherited trait or function had a specific gene directing its development and appearance. Id.
at 30.
18. Within this period "powerful new genetic technologies have been developed that greatly
increase the ability to manipulate the inherited characteristics of plants, animals, and
microorganisms." Id. at 3. The techniques developed have been applied to various industries,
such as pharmaceutical, food processing, and pollution control. Id. Applied genetics is
divided into two categories: classical genetics and molecular genetics. Id. Classical genetics
has reference to the natural process of selective breeding, using natural mating methods.
Molecular genetics is a more sophisticated technology, involving the "directed manipulation
of the genetic material itself." Id.
19. Id. at 33-34. The DNA molecule was described as a simple molecule composed of a
small sugar molecule, a phosphate (a phosphorous atom surrounded by four oxygen atoms),
and four kinds of simple organic chemicals known as nitrogenous (nitrogen-containing) bases.
Id. at 34. A nucleotide consists of one sugar, one phosphate, and one base, and it is the
nucleotide which is the basic structural unit of the large DNA molecule. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. In the words of Watson and Crick:
If the actual order of the bases on one of the pair of chains were given, one could
write down the exact order of the bases on the other one, because of the specific
pairing. Thus one chain is, as it were, the complement of the other, and it is this
feature which suggests how the deoxyribonucleic acid molecule might duplicate itself.
Id. at 35. The structural model of Watson and Crick demonstrated how DNA makes an
exact copy of itself and thus transfers genetic information from a parent cell to two progeny
cells. Id.
22. See id. at 19, 20, 21. The structure defined by Watson and Crick consisted of two
long chains (twisted around each other in a double helix or spiral) formed by phosphates and
sugar and one nitrogenous base attached to each sugar. Id. at 33-34. The two chains (or
backbones) are "held together like the supports of a ladder by weak attractions between the
bases protruding from the sugar molecules." Id. at 35.
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which they could theorize and form varied genetic combinations'
that can be duplicated because of the unique property of DNA to
serve as a template (blueprint or pattern) for the creation of two
identical molecules.'
The work products of DNA research began to move out of
the laboratory' into industry when the commercialization potential
became apparent.' This transfer of technological techniques to the
marketplace created a new industry offering new products of great
significance in many areas, with perhaps the most dramatic impact
in the world of medicine. This new vista of commercial activity
23. Id. at 35. The combination of nucleotides (bases) of one backbone has its "directly
opposite complimentary sequences" on the other backbone (somewhat like looking in the
mirror and seeing an opposite but identical reflection). Id. There are four different
nitrogenous bases: adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine. There is an attraction between
adenine (A) and thymine (T), and between guanine (G) and cytosine (C). Id. Therefore, if
one backbone reads A-T-G-C-T-T-A-A, the other backbone has to contain the directly
opposite complimentary sequence: T-A-C-G-A-A-T-T.
24. Id. As one chain is the compliment of the other, it is possible for the duplication
process to take place. When the two parts of the molecule are separated, there are two
separate chains, consisting of unpaired bases. Each base will attract its complimentary
molecule. This pairing results in the formation of two DNA molecules which are identical
to each other as well as to the original molecule. Id. See also E. SYLVESrER & L. KLOTZ,
supra note 3, at 40-41.
25. Thomas, Overview: Regulating Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POLY REV. 309 (1985). In
the early 1970's the biotechnological techniques became more than research tools as they
became applied science and evolved into a commercial technology. Id. at 311.
26. E. SYLvSmER & L Ktorz, supra note 3, at 96-105.
27. Id. at 9-15. The new industry has provided us with new forms of drugs with great
potential for fighting human ailments. Some examples are: (1) the manufacture by genetic
engineering of human insulin, which is a lifesaving drug for diabetics. Id. at 11. Formerly,
this essential hormone was in danger of being in short supply as the only source was from
the pancreas of slaughtered animals. This animal insulin, although similar to, is not identical
to human insulin, and this difference is thought to have been responsible for allergic reactions
among some diabetics. (2) Human growth hormone (HGH), produced genetically, is now on
the market and it may provide help for burns and wounds as well as dwarfism. Id. (3) The
production of interferon, a natural antiviral component of the human cell. Id. at 12-13.
Scientists look to interferon as the "magic bullet" against viral diseases and cancer. Id. at 12.
The production of the genetically engineered human vaccine against hepatitis is another
example of how this technology has impacted on medical science. Id. at 10. Before this new
product became available, hepatitis vaccine had been derived from human blood donated by
patients who had recovered from a bout with the illness. Id. The individuals receiving this
vaccine, however, were in danger of becoming infected with the AIDS virus, which may have
been present in the blood of the donor. Id. In the genetically produced vaccine, this threat
is eliminated since it is manufactured by a technique using bacteria. Id.
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became a reality when the United States Supreme Court, in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,l sanctioned ownership rights to a
microscopic living organism created by means of genetic
manipulation,29 by affirming a patent granted for a microbe that "ate"
oil spillage."
The work done by Chakrabarty was made possible through a
procedure developed by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer.31 It was
the technique of "gene splicing," an innovative technology based on
the concept of using the cells from bacteria to function as factories
for producing genetic products,32 which made possible the transition
Genetic researchers are learning to recognize segments of DNA which represent the
genetic signatures of disease-causing microorganisms as they exist in a diseased patient, and
are learning to recognize "genetic markers" which signify the presence of a genetic disease in
a fetus in utero. Id. at 15-16.
28. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
29. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, rejected the argument that new life
forms could not be patented. The Court held that the organism was patentable under a
"plain reading of the patent act." Id. at 317. The organism was deemed to be the result of
Chakrabarty's work, and not something found in nature. Id. at 310.
Since the Court held that the critical basis for patentability was a determination as to
whether the organism was manmade rather than naturally occurring, it can be anticipated that
the "Chakrabany opinion could be read as precedent for including any genetically engineered
organism (except humans) within the scope of section 101" of the patent law. IMPACr, supra
note 17, at 241.
30. Chakrabarty, while working as a research scientist for General Electric, developed a
strain of bacteria by means of genetic engineering that was capable of degrading "four of
the major components of crude oil." IMPAcr, supra note 17, at 240. This newly created
microbe was placed.on straw, which served as a carrier, and when dropped on an oil spill
broke down the components of oil into harmless products. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303, n.2.
The microbe used the oil as food, and when the oil was consumed the microbe disappeared
since its food supply was depleted. Id. at 303. See IMPACr, supra note 17, at 240.
31. E. SYLVESTER & L. KLOrz, supra note 3, at 67. Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer
decided to collaborate on researching recombinant DNA by combining the two discoveries
each had made. Id.
32. J. FALK1NHAM, BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE AND INDUSTRIAL APPLICATION 8-10 (1985).
The vehicle used to transfer the desired gene to the bacteria is the plasmid (circular form of
DNA found in bacteria). SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 32-33. The plasmid is cut by using
enzymes which cut up very specific DNA sequences. The desired gene is inserted into the
plasmid, and the cut ends are rejoined by means of other enzymes (ligases). Id. at 33. The
gene is now part of the plasmid which, due to its capacity to self-replicate, becomes a part
of the bacterial cell. As the bacterium reproduces, it will produce countless replicates of itself
containing the newly implanted gene. It is the universality of the genetic code which makes
the injection of specific genes into the microorganism and the resulting production of the
desired compound possible. Id. at 34. See FALKINHAM, supra, at 9-10.
from the laboratory to industry."a
Cohen-Boyer's patent is distinguished from Chakrabarty's in
two ways: (1) Cohen-Boyer is a process patent (method of doing
something) as compared to the Chakrabarty's product patent (the
actual article of manufacture); (2) Cohen and Boyer did not receive
personal financial benefit, since their royalties were given to their
respective universities, whereas Chakrabarty's patent is industry
owned, although dependent on the process delineated by the
university researchers.'
The successful ventures of Chakrabarty and Cohen and Boyer
represent dramatic incidents in the technology saga. Their work has
been instrumental in the development and refinement of the three
standard biological techniques utilized in biotechnology: "tissue and
cell culture technology, hybridoma technology, and recombinant
DNA technology."
35
Tissue and cell culture involves the acquisition of human tissue
from patients, volunteer research subjects, and cadavers, and
propagating those cells in a controlled laboratory environment to
produce a cell line which may, in turn, be used to produce a specific
substance.'
Hybridoma methodology consists of the fusion by chemical
means of a cell from a malignant tumor with a normal cell capable
of producing an antibody (disease fighting protein). The fused cell,
The bacteria used in the recombinant DNA procedure has been likened to a factory.
Thus, machine tools may be said to perform "the same function within the factory that DNA
molecules perform within the cell nucleus: both have the power not only to fabricate the
components of the larger world of which each is a part, but also each has the power to
replicate itself." Milby, The New Biology and the Question of Personhood" Implications for
Abortion, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 31, 34 n.13 (1983).
33. E. SYLVESTER & L. Kum, supra note 3, at 68.
34. Id. at 139-40. The Cohen-Boyer patent is considered the central patent to gene
engineering, as it covers almost all commercial applications of recombinant DNA- However,
it was not until August 1984 that the University received a patent on the microbe itself.
The patent obtained in 1980 was for the process to create the microbe. Id. at 140.
35. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 5.
36. Id. at 31-35. "A cell line is a sample of cells, having undergone the process of
adaptation to artificial laboratory cultivation, that is now capable of sustaining continuous,
long-term growth in culture." Id. at 3 n.1. Immortal cell lines refer to cells kept alive
through constant reproduction. Id. at 33.
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a hybridoma, has the capacity to reproduce as rapidly as a malignant
cell, but produces the desired antibody rather than the diseased
cancerous protein."
"Recombinant DNA technology, also referred to as genetic
engineering, involves the direct manipulation of the genetic material
(the DNA) of a cell."''3 By using the Cohen-Boyer patented
process,39 it is now possible to recombine "genes from one species
with those from another."4  Identical copies of these newly
engineered genes are produced by the process referred to as "gene
cloning," utilizing various recombinant DNA techniques."
As the commercial aspects of biotechnological research become
more attractive, the fundamental issues of ownership of prior
research material as well as the final product must be confronted.4"
ILL PRoPEPRTY RIGHTs IN HUMAN CELs AND TIssuEs
UsED IN COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES
The question as to what rights an individual has "in the
commercial exploitation of his or her own body" 3 has generated
both legal and ethical issues. There are no judicial decisions to
provide guidance as to what the legal resolution will be to this
problem. Four cases, relevant to the question of ownership of
human biological materials, indicate the anticipated trend of
37. FALKINHAM, supra note 32, at 249-61.
38. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 5.
39. See E. SYLVESTER & L KLtOrZ, supra note 3, at 136-49.
40. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 44. See also E. SYLvErR & L. KLoTrz, supra
note 3, at 41-46. The process is schematically described and analogized to the building of
a house.
41. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 41.
42. Wagner, Human Tissue Research: Who Owns the Results? 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 329 (1987). The issue of ownership evolving from research relates to both the
intangible innovative ideas and the tangible effect represented in some embodiment of the
idea. The questions then posed are: "in whom do incipient interests rest; and what effect
does ownership of the prior research material have?" Id. at 331.
43. Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue 34 UCLA L REV. 207 (1986). Products derived from
human cells are being developed and marketed. The question of "fair compensation" for the
cell donor is to be determined by the courts. Id. at 263-64.
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litigation involving biotechnology.' Two of these cases focus on
researchers, whereas the other two involve the rights of cell donors.45
In the first case, a microbiologist working under a federal
research grant developed and cultured a cell line from normal
human cells and marketed the cells for the production of viral
vaccines.' When the National Institutes of Health charged him with
the wrongful exploitation of a product developed with federal
funding, he filed suit seeking title to the cells.47 In an out of court
settlement, the microbiologist kept the money from the sale of the
cells, but there was no determination as to the ownership of the cell
line. '
In Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Golde, Koefler, and the Regents
of the University of California,' an action was filed against the
University seeking declaratory relief to proceed with the marketing
of interferon (a natural anti-viral protein) which was genetically
engineered from a cell line." The basic issues raised in this case
44. Lippert, Issues and Trends of Current Litigation Involving Biotechnology, in 206 TRENDS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY & CHEMICAL PATENT LAW 205 (1985). The very nature of the technology
will give rise to novel issues that have never been directly addressed by the courts. As there
is little or no case law, the resolution of any future legal actions will have to be decided by
the "application of known and somewhat stable law." Id. at 207-08. It is to be expected that
in future litigation, the human donor will be a party to biotechnological legal actions. Id. at
210.
45. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 24-46.
46. Id. at 25. The case was settled out of court. Holden, Hayflick Case Settled, SCIENCE,
Jan. 15, 1982, at 271.
47. OWNERSHIP OF CEus, supra note 6, at 25.
48. Holden, supra note 46, at 271. Hayflick sued the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
for violation of his rights under the Privacy Act; he claimed damage to his career by the
accusative reports issued by the NIH and claimed title to all the remaining cells, which had
been preserved by freezing. The settlement of the case did not resolve the ownership dispute,
as the agreement stated that title to the cells, as well as the proceeds, "are in reasonable
dispute." Id. The money from the sale of the cells was kept in escrow during the conflict
and, by the agreement, the total ($90,000) transferred to Hayflick. Id. This amount is an
indication of how profitable these cell lines can be.
49. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Golde, Koefler, & Regents of Univ. of Cal., Civ. No. 80-
3601 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1982).
50. Bent, Ownership Rights in Tangible Biological Materials, in BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT
PRACnC F1-F2 (1985) (citing Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Golde, Koefler & Regents of Univ.
of Cal., Civ. No. 80-3601 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1982)). The original cell line was developed by a
researcher at the University of California from cells derived from a leukemia patient. Id. at
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were whether the cell line belonged to the University and whether
the incorporation of the genes of the cell line into the
microorganism represented conversion of the cell line." Here again,
this case ended in a private settlement. 2
In re Hagiwarad3 involves a dispute arising over the ownership
of human biological material provided by a cell donor. Dr.
Hagiwara, unsolicited, donated lymph cells taken from his mother
who was ill with cervical cancer. These cells when fused to a cell
line developed at the University of California, San Diego, resulted
in a "hybridoma that secreted an anti-tumor antibody."54 After
returning to Japan, the Hagiwara family claimed a financial interest
in the cell line and antibody, a claim based on the "tangible property
rights in the original tissue."55 The settlement arising from a private
agreement resolved the matter: The University held all patent rights,
and the Hagiwara Research Institute (owned by Dr. Hagiwara's
father) was given "an exclusive license to exploit the patent in Asia."
Fl. The cell line was then transferred to the National Cancer Institute, and the University
claimed the transfer was accompanied by restrictions that the cells were not to be distributed
to others. Id. However, Hoffman-LaRouche obtained the cells from the Cancer Institute
and, together with Genentech (a biotechnology firm), produced a recombinant DNA
microorganism capable of producing leukocyte interferon. Id. at F2.
51. Id. at F2.
52. Lippert, supra note 44, at 213. Although there was no resolution of the provocative
questions before the court, the case focused on the issues that may arise when there are
several parties involved in the commercialization of a product derived from research at an
academic institution.
53. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 26. For further background information to
the Hagiwara case, see Sun, Scientists Settle Cell Line Dispute, SCIENCE, Apr. 22, 1983, at 393.
In the dispute over the ownership of the cells, Hagiwara claimed title on the basis of familial
relationship as well as his contention that the idea of the fusion of the cell was his
contribution. The university researcher argued that his group had the necessary expertise and
it was they who were responsible for the creation of the hybridoma. Id.
The out of court settlement left unresolved the question of ownership based on familial
relationship. Id. at 394. Two points of view were expressed: An attorney representing the
University argued that since the hybridoma "is a newly created biological entity" the ownership
question revolves around the identification of the inventor, and the determination of donor
or family ownership is irrelevant. Id. The attorney representing Hagiwara asserted the right
of cell donors to share in any subsequent profit. He commented that the ownership question
"is an area of the law that needs to be explored." Id.
54. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 26.
55. Id.
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The agreement also provided for the payment of royalties to the
University of California for any commercial use of the hybridoma
line. 6
A case pending in the California Court of Appeals, Moore v.
Regents of University of California,"7 "promises to create valuable
precedent in the areas of the patient's property rights in his or her
body and the relative duties of the physician and the research
institution to the patient."58 John Moore, a victim of a rare form of
cancer, underwent surgery for the removal of his spleen. 9 Moore's
doctor and his technician developed a cell line from the removed
spleen and named it the "Mo" cell line.' The University was
assigned the patent obtained by the doctor and his technician for
this cell line and the various medically useful products derived from
it.61 In 1984 Moore filed a suit claiming conversion of his cells and
a right to a financial share in the commercial profits.62 Further, Mr.
Moore contends that, although he signed a standard surgery
informed consent form assigning all rights to his spleen and blood
parts to the medical center, his consent was "not 'informed' and
therefore void."' His claim is based on the fact that the medical
56. Sun, supra note 53, at 394.
57. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. B021195 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 15, 1986
& Aug. 28, 1986, consolidated Dec. 5, 1986); Comment, supra note 43, at 213 n.24.
58. Comment, supra note 43, at 213.
59. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 26.
60. Id.
61. Id. The University of California, the assignee of the patents, entered into a four year
agreement granting exclusive use of the "Mo" line to both a biotechnological company and a
pharmaceutical company. Id. Several products have been produced from the "Mo" cell line
including substances that can enhance the development of red blood cells, develop a purer
form of interferon, as well as fight certain diseases. Id.
62. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 26.
63. Anderson, Patent Lawyers Meet The Biotechnolog Challenge, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1987,
at 6, col. 6. See also OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 10. Consent involves
communication between the health caregiver and the patient or between the researcher and
the subject, regarding the benefits and risks of the specific treatment or research project. Id.
The information that should be disclosed for valid consent must be adequate to enable the
patient or subject for research "to reach a reasoned choice." Id. In general, the authorization
to proceed must be based on disclosure of the nature and purpose of the treatment or
research, as well as details of the risks and benefits and any alternative procedures. Id.
Other elements to be taken into account are voluntariness of consent obtained under
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personnel, in addition to failing to inform him of the "enormous
economic and commercial value" in his cells, "affirmatively asserted"
to him that they "had no economic or commercial value."' The
trial judge dismissed the case for failure "to state a legally
recognized claim."'
Regardless of the outcome on appeal, Moore v. Regents of
University of California will have an impact on the relationship
between patients and researchers. Patients' rights issues will
necessarily have to be resolved. Such questions include whether a
cell line used in academic research and subsequently proven to be
commercially valuable, entitles the cell donor to a legally recognized
proprietary right to the cell line and its products."
IV. COmNROVERS L ASPECTS OF SALE
OF HuMAN BODY PARTS
In the absence of "judicial precedents nor statutes directly
address[ing]"67 the problem, the courts and the legislature will have
to evaluate all sides of the issue' when considering any rights which
may arise from supplying biological material to either an academic
or commercial research institution.6
Several arguments have been presented by those who favor
circumstances free from any coercion or undue influence. Id. See also id. at 94.
64. Anderson, supra note 63, at col. 6.
65. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 26.
66. Seide, Moore v. Regents of The University of California, AM. CHEMICAL Soc'y NEWSL
8 (Aug. 1987).
67. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 9.
68. Comment, supra note 43, at 228. The value of human tissue has risen considerably
as a result of the new technical advances. The profits of the biotechnology industry are
expected to increase extensively, and it is argued that the donor is entitled to benefit from
his donation. Id.
69. Wagner, supra note 42, at 341. There are four ways for lawfully accessing human
tissue for research investigation: (A) Statutory post mortem methods--(1) the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) which provides for the post mortem transfer of tissue and cells
as a gift, (2) state statutes which allow for the removal of tissue from unclaimed bodies, to
be used for scientific studies; (B) Intervivos methods (from living donors) require informed
consent for any potential risks during removal--(3) the removal of tissues which are diseased
or removed for diagnostic tests, (4) the removal specifically for research. Id.
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the recognition of property rights in human tissue. One contention
is that the denial of the economic benefits accruing from the
commercial exploitation of the donor's cells is ethically wrong.7" The
acquisition of this property right would, therefore, "provide a morally
acceptable result by giving effect to notions of fairness and
preventing unjust enrichment."' By not compensating the patient
donor, the researcher is unjustly enriched since only the "researcher's
contribution is recognized."'
The profiting from one's own body has been equated with
slavery; that is, one individual has ownership of the body of another
individual and is therefore in violation of the thirteenth
amendment.' The issue of slavery as a moral basis for arguing
against the attaining of property rights in parts of the human body
is contradicted by those supporting this right. They argue that a
"right would not contravene the thirteenth amendment's prohibition
of slavery because it does not permit the transfer of one's liberty."
They further assert:
If an analogy to slavery is to be drawn in the context
70. Wagner, supra note 42, at 343. One medical ethics professor, Thomas Murray, looks
to an ethical consideration for the use of the human tissue by the one to whom it was given
freely. He theorizes "an implied reservation of interest in the donor which precludes
unanticipated use of the gift." Id. He further states that this "implied reservation" is derived
from "a mutual, though implicit, understanding." Id. He believes the donor should be justly
compensated for any use of the donated tissues. Id.
71. Comment, supra note 43, at 229.
72. Id. at 230. By recognition of the property rights of the donor, monetary compensation
to the donor and the researcher would be "proportionate to the value of their respective
contributions." Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall
exist within the United States ... ." Id.).
74. Comment, supra note 43, at 225. The property rights are established in one's own
body and not in the body of another. This does not eliminate one's liberty but, by provision
of a way to profit from one's own body, actually enhances one's liberty. Id. The author
comments on the fact that there are individuals who commonly profit from their bodies. Id.
He makes reference to models and public figures who make themselves available for
promoting products through advertising. Id. Additionally, there are individuals who receive
payment for the sale of "their bodily substances, such as blood or semen." Id. at 229. He
asserts that "sharing the commercial development of the body's unique biochemical traits is
just another means of using the body for profit." Id. at 229.
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of human biologics, slavery actually argues for recognizing
a property right in one's own body: the slave-owner
profiting from ownership of the slave is analogous to the
research institution profiting from the derivatives of the
donor's body to the exclusion of the donor. The moral
arguments raised by slavery actually favor, rather than
oppose, recognition of the right of commerciality.75
Another aspect of this problem involves the patient/physician
relationship, characterized by the "unequal bargaining power of the
parties."76 Inasmuch as the physicians are deemed to have "all of
the knowledge and power," patient's have no option but to depend
and rely on their medical superiority.7  One proponent of the
property rights in patient cell material postulates that "property
rights are necessary to counteract the way in which biotechnology
improves the already superior bargaining position of the physician."'7
Therefore by recognizing the donor's right in the cells, the physician
will be required to negotiate with the donor prior to removal of the
tissue or, in the alternative, "to engage in bargaining once the
commercial value of the patient's tissue becomes apparent.""
75. Id. at 225.
76. Id. at 231.
77. Id. at 231 n.113. "Ihe relationship between a physician and his patient is fiduciary,
which, like all such relationships, imposes a duty of full disclosure." Id. at 231. (citing Berkey
v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 804, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 77 (Ct. App. 1969)). See also Cobb
v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (Sup. Ct. 1972), where the court noted
that "the patient, being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and
trust in his physician for the information upon which he relies during the decisional process,
thus raising an obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length transactions." Id.
As a fiduciary, if the physician is to profit from the patient's tissues after failing to fully
inform the patient, this commercial profiting would be both morally wrong and a breach of
fiduciary duty. Comment, supra note 43, at 231.
78. Comment, supra note 43, at 231. When utilizing genetic engineering procedures, all
of the commercially valuable body material can be removed at one time. When the
commercial value becomes known, it is usually too late for the patient donor to derive any
financial benefits. Id.
79. Id. at 232 & n.114. See also United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979),
reh'g granted, 589 F.2d 843, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979). This
case involved a tax dispute concerning money Garber received for the use of her blood, for
marketing an antibody. To maintain the supply of the antibody, several withdrawals of
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Those espousing the cause of property rights in donated human
tissue claim that it would provide a balance between all those
involved, by assuring that all interested parties in the biological
materials would share in the ensuing benefits.'
To those opposed, the selling of body parts is considered to
be repugnant as it detracts from the dignity and respect owed to the
human body."1 Further, it is argued, the payment for cell parts
would "coerce the poor to donate, encourage the diseased to
conceal their defects and lead body brokers to murder the innocent
for their parts."'
Companies and individuals who have done the research work
assert that the value of the product resulted from their work and
not the human source of the tissue.' Additionally, they claim that
"keeping track of the identities of the many sources necessary for
the development of most cell lines would vastly increase transaction
costs and overburden the research community."' 4 It is further
maintained that the excised tissue (being tumorous or diseased) was
removed for remedial purposes and thus represents a "negative
value" to the patient." The removed tissue was harmful to the
Gerber's blood had to be made. This put her in a good bargaining position, as she was able
to negotiate "for the highest bid." Garber, 589 F.2d at 847. The author notes that with the
advent of biotechnological methods, one withdrawal of the biological material is usually
sufficient, thereby reducing the bargaining position of the donor.
80. Comment, supra note 43, at 232-36. The interested parties would include the researcher
seeking both scholastic recognition and financial reward, the commercial enterprise looking
for profit, and the patient donor wanting to be compensated.
81. Sherman, The Selling of Body Parts, NA'rL L.J., Dec. 7, 1987 at 1, 33, col. 2.
82. Id. at 32. Although these consequences can be avoided by medical examinations to
assure the need for surgery and health of tissues, and by allowing only the donor and not the
body broker to receive payment. Id.
83. Id. at 33. See also Wagner, supra note 42, at 335-36. As the biotechnology industry
grows, and as the race for profits intensifies, the source of the human tissue (the patient or
research donor) is, for now, excluded from financial sharing, since "a researcher has a positive
common law right to subjectively possess the new ideas of his research independent of any
precedent property interest in the research material." Id. at 336.
84. Sherman, supra note 81, at 33. But see Comment, supra note 43, at 241. However,
keeping accurate records of the source of tissue is necessary for several basic reasons: "to
trace anomalies to the medical history of the patient, to maintain title for other researchers
and for themselves, and to insure reproducibility of the experiment." Id.
85. Comment, supra note 43, at 236. Often the commercial value of the excised tissue is
1988]
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individual and can therefore have no positive value to the donor but
does provide medical knowledge that will benefit society."
V. F2TAL TIssUE
Another aspect of the problems encountered in tissue removal
pertains to the aborted fetus. Research and potential use of fetal
tissue has, according to some legal authorities and bioethicists, raised
many "thorny moral and legal problems."' It has been suggested
that the opposition to fetal research has been generated by those
who, in resistance to the Roe v. Wade ' abortion decision, fear that
any medical benefits derived from fetal research will negate their
anti-abortion battle."'
not evident immediately, and the value is only a remote possibility. Id.
86. Wagner, supra note 42, at 351-52. The original source material has been transformed
by the work of the researcher and this is no longer the same material. Human tissue "is res
nullius, a matter belonging to no one." Id. at 352.
87. Sherman, supra note 81, at 33. The definition of fetus, as delineated in 45 C.F.R. §
46.203(c) (1983), is "the product of conception from the time of implantation . . . until a
determination is made ... that it is viable." Id. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201-11 (1983) relates to the
protection offered to pregnant women and fetuses in the area of research developmental
activities. Id.
A distinction is made between moral and ethical issues. Moral issues involve the values
and duties of people directly involved in making the relevant decisions. The ethical issues
go beyond the immediate situation to the effect the decision would have on a large number
of people. Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in Prospective Human Gene Therapy,
69 VA. L. REv. 515 (1983).
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court struck down all restrictive
state abortion statutes. In that decision, a three-part schedule or guideline was enunciated
to determine the constitutionality of future statutes: (1) First trimester of pregnancy--state
has no authority to impose regulation or restriction on abortion. (2) Second trimester--state
is empowered to regulate abortion in a manner that will protect the health of the mother.
(3) After fetal viability, the state could prohibit abortion on the grounds of a state interest
in the protection of the life of the fetus, except if abortion was necessary to save the life of
the mother. Id. at 163-65.
89. Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the States, 15 HASTnNGS CENTER REP. 12, 13
(1985). The author noted that before the Roe v. Wade decision, there was little public
concern expressed for fetal research. Id. at 12. He asserts fetal research and abortion
present the same dilemma, in that "we are weighing the life, dignity, and comfort of the fetus
(or abortus) against the lives, dignity, and comfort of others." Id. He distinguishes the
situation of fetal research, by pointing out that we are not faced "with the mother's claim
to reproductive autonomy." Id. He further suggests there is a legal difference in that there
is no Supreme Court opinion constitutionally restricting laws against fetal research, as has
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However, experimentation conducted in the United States and
abroad indicates that therapies using fetal cells appear to be very
promising, due to the "unique capacity" of cells of fetuses less than
sixteen weeks old "to reproduce themselves, form new connections,
and, perhaps rejuvenate ailing adults" with the added advantage of
causing few immunity problems upon implantation.' The cell lines
developed from the cells of fetuses could impart significant financial
value to the original fetal cells. 1
The increased requests for fetal cells presents another
confrontational issue: whether the mother of the aborted fetus
should be allowed to decide what should be done with the remains."
been done for abortions. Id. at 13.
90. Sherman, supra note 81, at 32. See also Nightline: Fetal Transplants (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 6, 1988) (transcript No. 1728) at 2, 4. A Mexican doctor, involved in
experiments in which cells from an aborted thirteen week old fetus were placed into the
brains of two adult victims of Parkinson's disease (a degenerative nervous disorder), explained
that the technique does not effect a cure. Id. at 4. By providing the adult brain with fetal
cells which produce the agent (dopamine) missing in the individual, the symptoms are
improved and the patient can function. Id. at 4.
91. Sherman, supra note 81, at 32, 33. Some biotechnology firms have produced immortal
cell lines from fetal cells. One of the biotechnology companies plans to test the ability of
fetal pancreatic cells to produce insulin in diabetic adults. Id. at 32. The company expects
to profit from their work with fetal cells. Id. at 33.
92. Baron, supra note 89, at 13. Although a woman has the option of being free of an
unwanted pregnancy, "she does not necessarily have to determine what shall be done to the
fetus before, during, or after its removal from her body." Id. at 13. See also Sherman, supra
note 81, at 33. In the view of Arthur L. Caplan, director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics
at the University of Minnesota, "women who have chosen abortion already have displayed a
conflict of interest with the fetus and should not be allowed to decide what can be done with
its remains." Id. at 33.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at A23, col. 2. A novel situation is reported wherein a
couple expecting a child have been advised that their baby will be born with a partial brain.
The mother has elected to carry the fetus to full term in order that the healthy organs can
be used for transplants. However, because of "legal and ethical questions", the parents have
not been able to locate a hospital that will agree to keep the child alive after birth (without
a respirator, the child would not survive more than a day). Id. One of the legal obstacles
is that transplant centers will not accept donors with this disorder since under the brain death
standard they are not "considered dead under state laws." Id. If the organs cannot be kept
alive until needed, they cannot be transplanted. Id. "But a respirator makes it harder to
determine the time of brain death, and experts say it is ethically and legally unacceptable to
remove organs until that time." Id. It is interesting to speculate whether biotechnology
methods could be utilized to create cell lines from the fetal tissue.
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A potential source of difficulty involves the recognition of viability,93
and a determination of when the "separate and legal status of the
fetus begins."' Supreme Court Justice O'Connor has expressed the
concern that in making decisions affecting the fetus and the mother,
the courts are placed in the position where "[w]ithout the necessary
expertise or ability, courts must... pretend to act as science review
boards .... ,9 The fear that women may deliberately get pregnant
with the intent to abort in order to obtain the financial award for
the fetal cells has been presented as a strong objection to the
granting of proprietary rights to the mother.9'
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). Viability is defined as the point at which
the fetus is capable of living outside of the mother's womb. Id. The decision is vague as to
the actual time. However, the decision expressly denied the assignment of the status of
person to the fetus, prior to viability, under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 162. In
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 (1976), the Missouri statutory definition
of viability was held to be constitutional. Viability was determined to be when the life of the
unborn infant may be indefinitely maintained outside the mother by either natural or artificial
life supporting means. Id. at 96.
94. Akron v. Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 456-57 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Here, the Court struck down a restrictive state ordinance directed against women
electing to abort. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor opined that the standards set down by Roe
v. Wade were not acceptable:
Just as improvements in medical technology inevitably will move forward the point
at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health, different
technological improvements will move backward the point of viability at which the
State may proscribe abortions except when necessary to preserve the life and health
of the mother.
Id.
95. Id. at 458.
96. Nightline: Fetal Transplants (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 6, 1988) (transcript No.
1728) at 3. Jeremy Rifkin, a noted lobbyist and writer, who is an outspoken critic of genetic
engineering, was interviewed on the program. He expressed his fear that, because of the
anticipated heightened demand for fetal cells, there is a "possibility that women might in fact
be paid to harvest and abort the fetuses for the purpose of this technology." Id. at 6. He
postulated the creation of a new industry of women who would be contracted to become
"breeders." Id. at 3.
The focus has been put on the profit motive of the donor. However, consideration
should be given to the voluntary donor of cells to a close member of the family. In this same
T.V. program, the daughters of a physician who was suffering from the degenerative effects
of Parkinson's disease, put forth their plan to conceive so that they could have the fetuses
aborted in order to provide the fetal cells for their father. Id. at 3.
NOTES
There is a statutory basis for the disposition of the dead
fetuses in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).Y1 The Act
is enacted in all fifty states and governs research and
experimentation on dead fetuses. Its definition for decedent
includes any "stillborn infant or fetus."' The UAGA permits the
gift of "all or part of the .. body of a dead fetus to be used for
research or therapeutic purposes."" The reference in the UAGA is
to a presentation without any financial remuneration, in contrast to
the current controversy over economic compensation to the donor.
Amid all the controversy surrounding fetal research, such
research in the United States presently receives support primarily
from the private sector, because funding for the Ethics Advisory
Board (EAB)' ° (provided for in the federal guidelines for fetal
research to review and monitor ongoing investigations) was allowed
to lapse in 1980, thereby effectively halting all federally funded
studies."' Consequently, there has been disruption in the partnership
between government and private enterprises and compliance with
the federal research guidelines."° These guidelines are based on
"three central concepts: (1) informed consent; (2) a weighing of the
risks to the fetus against the benefits to be obtained by the
research; and (3) the distinction between therapeutic and
nontherapeutic research."' 3
VI. INFORMED CONSENT AND DIsCLosuRE
Informed consent to medical treatment or participation in
research products refers to an individual's "agreement to allow the
97. For a table of jurisdictions where the Act has been adopted see Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (Table of Jurisdiction where Act has been adopted). Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, 8A
U.L.A- 15-6 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
98. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, § 1(b), 8A U.L.A. 30 (1987).
99. Id. at § 3(a).
100. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 (1983).
101. Fletcher & Schulman, Fetal Research: The State of the An; The State of the Question,
15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6 (1985).
102. Id. at 11.
103. Banon, Legislative Regulation of Fetal Eperimentation: On Negotiating Compromise in
Situations of Ethical Pluralism, in GENErICS III, supra note 2, at 431, 434.
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activity to happen, based on full disclosure of the facts needed to
make a decision intelligently.""°  Before performing any medical
procedure for either diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, the health
care providers or researchers must secure the proper authorization. 5
The liability of the physician depends on whether there was consent
or informed consent."°  In situations where no consent was
obtained, the courts will find the physician liable for battery,
whereas failure of the physician to provide sufficient information
gives rise to an action in negligence.0 7
Most states have enacted informed consent legislation, which
apply to the traditional medical situation and provide for the
appropriate standards of disclosure to insure that the patient
receives adequate information."° There are presently two standards
in use by the courts for evaluation of informed consent: "(1) the
professional or reasonable physician standard, and (2) the materiality
or reasonable patient standard.""°  Federal guidelines and
regulations have also been established for informed consent in the
104. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 93. See also W.H. ROACH, S.N. CHERNOFF &
C.L. ESLEY, MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW (1985) [hereinafter ROACH]. The patient or
patient's representative is entitled to be made aware of the nature and risk of the prescribed
procedure and to be told of the option of alternative methods. Id. at 159.
105. ROACH, supra note 104, at 159. The earliest lawsuits in England arose from those
situations where surgery was performed without obtaining consent or authorization. Id. at
160.
106. Id. at 160.
107. Most courts today no longer find the failure to disclose sufficient information invalid
consent or grounds for battery. "Thus, consent alone protects the health care provider from
liability for battery, while informed consent is necessary to protect the health care provider
from liability for negligence." Id.
108. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 94.
109. ROACH, supra note 104, at 161-62. States using the first standard recognize the
physician's "duty to provide the information that a reasonable medical practitioner would
provide under the same or similar circumstances." Id. at 162. Under the second standard,
the need of the patient is the determinant of the "extent of the physician's duty to provide
information." Id. The elements of full disclosure are: (1) disclosure of medical condition,
(2) the nature and purpose of the proposed procedure, (3) the risks and consequences, (4)
possible alternatives, and (5) consequences of rejection of treatment. Id.
A risk is material "when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should
know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster
of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy." Id. (citing Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)).
governing of human research."'
With the advent of biotechnology and its commercial potential,
however, the nature of the disclosure required becomes a difficult
problem to resolve. An important factor to be considered is
additional disclosure information necessitated by the latent discovery
of commercial gain (since the economic value to be derived from
the results of the therapy may not be apparent until a much later
time, after considerable research has been done)."'
Arguments favoring full disclosure include the concept "that
research subjects should have the right to decide what to do with
their own tissues and cells, and that current regulations require
disclosure of significant new findings developed during the course of
research which may relate to the subject's willingness to continue
participation."''
The arguments of those in opposition to disclosure of potential
commercial profitability refer to the possibility:
[T]hat any commercial gain is highly speculative, that
disclosure would hamper a research subject from reaching an
informed decision free from the undue influence that
monetary gain might provide, and the possibility that subjects
might endanger their health and skew research results by
hiding facts from researchers so that they can participate in
research that may provide financial remuneration."'
110. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 95. These regulations identify two consent
forms, the "long form and the short form." Id. at 95. The long form contains all the consent
elements, as contrasted with the short form, which merely indicates that the subject or a legal
authorized representative has received a verbal account of the necessary information. Both
forms are signed by the subject or representative, but the short form has the additional
requirement of the signature of a witness. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (1983).
111. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 108. The "latent" discovery may revise the
original consent terms. Id.
112. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 108-09. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5) (1987)
requires additional disclosures of "significant new findings." Id. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(4)
(1987) refers to the research subject's continued willing partcicpation or withdrawal. Id.
113. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 110.
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VIL INrEuE=AL PROPERTY RIGHTS
There are two alternative routes to protect the end result of
biotechnological research: the law of patents or the law of trade
secrets. A third possibility which has been suggested is protection
through the law of copyright."4
Congress is enpowered by the United States Constitution to
enact legislation to secure to inventors the exclusive right to their
inventions."' Because patents convey this exclusivity, they are
considered to be personal property."6 The Framers of the
Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention were firmly dedicated
to the preservation of an economic interest, based on a commitment
"to construct a viable, unfettered national economic order grounded
in bold, assertive private property interests.""' 7 The provision for
patent protection is consistent with this principle. The groundwork
set down by the Founding Fathers has thus made possible the
patenting of present day technology.
The biotechnical patents that are granted today are not for
"unaltered products of nature.""'  An application for a patent
claiming the entire genetic material present in a single cell would be
rejected, but it would be proper to seek a patent on a single gene
that had been isolated and which contains a genetically engineered
protein of interest for its practical applicability." 9
114. Id. at 70-79.
115. U.S. CONST. ert. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Id.).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) (establishes that "patents shall have the attributes of personal
property." Id.).
117. I.H. CARMEN, CLONING AND THE CONs'rTrroN (1985). The participants at the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia were concerned with the promotion of "useful'
inventions in aid of business enterprise." Id. at 5.
118. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 71.
119. Ropski & Kline, A Primer on Intellectual Property Rights: The Basis of Patents,
Trademarks, Copyrights, Trade Secrets and Related Rights, 50 ALB. L. REv. 405, 407-08 (1986).
Abstract ideas are not patentable. Patent protection is provided only for the application of
ideas. Thus, the requisites for acquiring a patent are the idea or conception, followed by the
reduction to practice. Id.
Reduction to practice is attained by "a physical demonstration of practicability, or the
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Such a property right would be granted if it satisfied the three
criteria of patentability: novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness. t2
The obviousness requirement is determined by the application of a
three-tiered test: "1) the scope and content of the prior art, 2) the
difference between the prior art and the patent claims at issue and
3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art";"' that is, if one
who is deemed to have a level of ordinary skill in the relevant art
would have reached the same conclusion without extensive
experimentation, it would not be patentable."
filing of a well-framed patent application." OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 71. The
entire genetic material would not be patentable since it is a "product of nature," and therefore
lacks novelty. Id. at 71. The genetically engineered gene satisfies the criteria of novelty,
since the conception of an idea has taken on a tangible form. Id.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) applies to the nonobviousness requirement:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
Id.
121. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 71.
122. Id. The landmark decision for unpatentability due to obviousness is Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The Court ruled that obviousness depends on three
conditions:
[These factual determinations include] the scope and content of the prior art...
,[the] differences between the prior art and the claims at issue ... ; and the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art .... [In addition, the court may consider] such
"secondary considerations" as commercial success, long felt but unresolved needs,
[and] failure of others ... [to solve the problem].
Id. at 17.
The final assessment of obviousness involves "the legal determination of whether the
invention would have been obvious, at the time the invention was made, to a person having
ordinary skill in the art." Ropski & Kline, supra note 119, at 410.
In Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1985),
Hybritech sued Monoclonal for infringement of its patent, detailing a method of testing for
the presence of specific antigens in body fluids, by the use of monoclonal antibodies. Id at
1345. Hybritech manufactured and sold diagnostic testing kits, limited to pregnancy and
ovulation determinations, using this same technique. Id. Monoclonal defended against the
infringement charges by claiming the patent was invalid because of obviousness. Id. at 1346.
The court found the Hybritech patent to be invalid under § 103 of the Patent Act, as being
obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art. The finding was based on prior art, which
disclosed the use of polyclonal antibodies, and once monoclonal antibodies became available
it was obvious to use them, as one with ordinary skill in the art would have reached the same
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The researcher who takes the cells from the patient or research
subject may obtain a patent on the altered form of the supplied
biological material, as long as it satisfies the statutory and case law
requirements for patentability." 3 Although the novel characteristic
of the patient's cells make it possible for the scientist to accomplish
a patentable invention, the donor of the material will not be
considered an inventor.124
There is an added requirement to patentability which demands
that, in return for this exclusive right to the invention, there must
be full disclosure of the product or process in the patent so as to
enable anyone with ordinary skill in the art to be able to reproduce
conclusion. Id. at 1354-56. See also Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Definitions:
Antigen--a foreign substance which, upon entry into the body, stimulates the immune
system to produce an antibody which defends the body against that specific substance.
Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1346.
Polyclonal antibody--is naturally obtained from body fluids, and thus contains a mixture
of several antibodies. Id.
Monoclonal antibody--is genetically engineered by fusion of spleen cells, containing a
particular antibody, with a malignant cell. The result is a hybridoma cell, which is then
cloned. Id.
Clone--the hybridoma cell proliferates rapidly to produce identical copies of itself, all
future cells having the same genetic material and are exact duplicates of the original. Id. at
1346-47.
In Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (BNA 1987), an appeal was brought to the Patent
Appeals Board from a rejection of a patent application for production of specially treated
cultivated oysters treated to induce growth. The examiners in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office had rejected the application under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. III
1985) for non-patentibility of a living entity found to occur naturally in nature and, under 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) for obviousness.
However, the Appeals Board also held that the rejection, under § 101, was in error, since
the decision in Chakrabany allows for the patenting of animals that are not naturally
occurring, and these oysters had been formed by means of human manipulation. Allen, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426-27; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980); 35 U.S.C. §
103 (non-obviousness requirement). However, the Appeals Board did uphold the rejection
for obviousness. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427. The basis for this decision was the disclosure
of a previously used method utilizing a chemical process rather than hydrostatic pressure has
applied in the subject case, and the application of this technique would have been obvious to
an individual with skill in the art. Id.
123. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 71.
124. Id. Because the donor did not conceive of the idea and was not actively involved in
the creation of the final product (the invention), and these are requirements for patentability,
the donor will not be considered an inventor. See Ropski & Kline supra note 119, at 411.
1988] NOTES
it."z  However, with microorganisms it is almost impossible to
provide a description which would enable reproducibility." In lieu
of a written description, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), requires that a sample of the culture be maintained
in a depository for the life of the patent."z Once a United States
patent is issued, anyone may go to the depository to take a
sample." Many inventors object to this requirement because they
feel that with the release of the organism from the depository to a
third party there is a transfer of information which could have been
sold by the inventor by means of a "know-how contract."'"
Some research institutions may opt for trade secret protection
rather than a patent, so as to avoid making full disclosure of their
invention to the public."3 Unlike patent protection, which is derived
from federal statute,"' trade secret protection is founded in common
125. Wagner, supra note 42, at 334. This exclusive monopolistic property right is the
consideration given for the inventor's 'Waiver of the common law right to maintain his
invention's subject matter in secrecy." Id. By means of the clear description of the invention,
the subject matter is placed in the public domain, to be used by anyone after the expiration
of the seventeen-year patent term. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
126. 1. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAw 5.10 (1982). "While 35 U.S.C. § 112
requires a written description, a written description alone may not make it practicable for
another to practice a microbiological invention." Id. It is extremely difficult to satisfy the
statutory requirements for a concisely written description that would enable one with ordinary
skill in the technology to reproduce the microorganism. Id.
127. Id. This requirement has been in effect since 1959. Id. (citation omitted).
128. Casey & Moss, Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnolog, 27 IDEA J.L. & TECH.
251 (1987). When access to the depository sample is open to the public, the patent has
already been issued; although anyone may take a sample, this sample cannot be reproduced
or sold without the patentee's permission. Id. at 251.
129. Id. at 251. When a license is issued by the patentee, it includes a "know-how" contract,
which supplies the information and training for the use of the invention. Id. at 261, 264.
130. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF ToRm § 747 comment b (1939).
A trade secret may consist of any formula, attern, device or complilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know how to use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving
materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
Id.
131. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-37 (1985) (governs the law of patents). 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.785 (1987)
(contains the rules and regulations). See Leuzzi, Process Inventions: Trade Secret or Patent
Protection, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 159 (1984). The Patent statute requires that the best way
of operating the invention, as well as the scope of the invention, be set forth. Id. at 162.
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The great advantage of trade secret protection is that the
invention may be kept a secret indefinitely; with a patent, the right
to exclusive use exists for only seventeen years.1 33 In order to keep
the biotechnical invention confidential, reasonable measures must be
instituted to secure the premises where the invention is maintained
and all information must be guarded against espionage."3  Many
states have enacted laws against the theft of trade secrets135 and
most courts will protect a firm against the misappropriation of such
secrets." Criminal charges for theft of trade secrets can also be
Statutory fees are required and the application for the patent must be examined by the Patent
and Trademark Office, which decides if the patent should be issued. Id. at 162. See also,
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 111.
132. Gabig, Federal Research Grant: Who Owns the Intellectual Property? 9 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 639 (1986). 'Trade secrets have evolved from a common law perception of
minimal business ethics." Id at 639. Each one of the fifty states can develop its own law of
trade secrets. Id. at 653-55. Trade secrets are established by "explicit conduct or agreement"
between interested parties. Id at 650. A trade secret is begun when the idea is molded into
a concrete form and "continues as long as secrecy is maintained." Id at 649. The bureaucratic
delays encountered in obtaining a patent are avoided. Id. See also Jager, Recent
Developments in Trade Secret Law, 24 PAT. L. ANN. 8-1, 8-2 (1986).
133. "[Trade secrets] have the advantage of being perpetual . . . as long as secrecy is
maintained." Jager, supra note 132, at 8-2.
134. Brown & Swanson, Maintaining the Competitive Edge: Lawful Protection of Trade-
Secrets, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 374 (1984-85). Three suggestions to help protect secrets are
(1) employment agreements should be signed before starting work, (2) non-competitive
agreements with employees should be in writing, and (3) plant security systems must be set
up. Id. at 379-86.
135. Lydon, The Deterrent Effect of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 69 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCIY 427 (1987). 'The common law of trade secret misappropriation
varies from state to state," and the remedies available depend on the jurisdiction where suit
is instituted. Id. at 427. To introduce some uniformity into trade secret protection, many
states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980). The definition
of trade secret in the Act is broader than that of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTs, supra
note 130, in that "the Act does not require commercial use by the trade secret owner. Thus,
'negative information,' such as that generated by unsuccessful research and development
programs, is protected by the Act." Lydon, supra, at 430.
136. Korn, Patent and Trade Secret Protection in University-Industry Research Relationships
in Biotechnology, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191 (1987). A plaintiff in a trade secret
misappropriation suit must satisfy three factors to be successful: (1) must have valid trade
secret, (2) measures taken to protect secrecy, and (3) defendant must have obtained the secret
information unfairly. Id. at 219.
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prosecuted by the federal government.137
The disadvantage of a trade secret, as compared to a patent,
is that in the event a competitor comes across the organism (which
is the subject of the trade secret) and through research develops the
same material, there is no legal recourse against this "honest
rediscovery."'" The patent holder, having the right of exclusivity,
can prohibit use of the invention and institute suit for
infringement.139
It is not likely that the biological material supplied by the
donor can be considered a trade secret of the patient. "A sample
of human tissues and cells is not itself a trade secret, but may be
characterized as a tangible article representing an intangible trade
secret."'" In order to decide if there is a trade secret involvement
between the donor and inventor, it must be determined whether the
patient "contemplated, at the time of transfer, that the excised tissue
or cells had commercial value."14
In an interesting approach, it has been suggested that the
"expressions of intracellular genetic information, novel or otherwise,
137. Brown & Swanson, supra note 134, at 375, 387, 392. Criminal prosecution can be
brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314 (1983) (for transporting stolen property), 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1983) (for receiving stolen
property), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1983). Although RICO was enacted as a criminal
statute, "it includes a private right of action for individuals to bring civil suit." Brown &
Swanson, supra note 134, at 375, 387, 392.
See Jager, supra note 132, at 8-6 (citing IBM Corp. v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 82 C 4976 (N.D.
Cal. 1982)). In IBM Corp., IBM accused Hitachi, a Japanese computer corporation, of the
misappropriation of valuable computer trade secrets. Id. The case was settled out of court,
and the documents were returned to IBM. Id. In addition, IBM had the right, for a period
of five years, to inspect all of Hitachi's new computer plants and equipment to determine if
any IBM trade secrets were incorporated. Id. Hitachi was also required to advise IBM of
any information of which they became aware relating to suspicion of theft of IBM trade
secrets. Id. See also Brown & Swanson, supra note 134, at 374-75.
138. Casey & Moss, supra note 128, at 257. See also Davidson & DeMay, Application of
Trade Secret Law to New Technology--Unwinding the Tangled Web, 12 WM. MrTCHELL L. REV.
579 (1986). A great deal can be learned by reverse engineering. "Reverse engineering means
starting with a known product and working backward to determine the process which aided
in its development." Id. at 584 n.24.
139. Casey & Moss, supra note 128, at 257. The patent holder can also collect royalties
by licensing other firms under the patent. Id. at 257.
140. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 79.
141. Id.
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within living microorganisms .. . are also works of authorship
protected from unauthorized reproduction by the terms of the
Copyright Act of 1976."142 Copyright provides protection for
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible means of
expression. "1" Under copyright law the author has the exclusive
rights for the specific form of expression, but not for the underlying
idea."4
There are two attractive features which make copyright
protection preferable to either patent or trade secret protection.
One is the long life of the copyright property.14 In the case of the
independent author, working for himself, the copyright exists from
the time of creation of the work until fifty years after the death of
the author." The copyright for work made by an employee either
in the scope of employment or by specific request as a commission,
belongs to the employer or the individual for whom the work was
specifically performed.1 7  In such cases, the duration of copyright
protection is for seventy-five years from publication or one hundred
years from the creation." The second feature is that publication
may take place immediately without jeopardizing copyright
protection. 49 By statutory definition, a work is considered to be
142. Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
191 (1982); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
144. Gabig, supra note 132, at 647-48. Although the statute requires the work to be
original, it does not necessarily have to be unique or unusual; it only has to be the intellectual
artifact of the author. Works protected by the Copyright Act specifically include literary,
musical, choreographic, pictorial and graphic works, computer programs, motion pictures, and
sound recordings. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). A copyright protects only the expression and
not the idea; anyone may use the idea, however, duplication is generally prohibited. Gabig,
supra note 132, at 648.
145. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). Patent protection lasts for seventeen years, and trade secrets
last only as long as they can be kept secret. Id.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). Protection is operable when the work is filed in a tangible
form. Under 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 405, 406 (1982), the copyright notice must be placed on
distributed copies of the work. The notice consists of the copyright symbol, the year of first
publication, and the name of the author. Id
147. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). This is considered to be work for hire. Id.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982).
149. Kayton, supra note 142, at 197.
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created when it is "fixed in a tangible medium of expression."'50
The proponent of this theory of copyright protection in
biotechnology inventions claims that "libraries of spliced DNA
fragments and cultures of engineered cells with a foreign DNA
sequence introduced therein are certainly 'fixed in tangible ...
medi[a] of expression. '151 A comparison is made to digital
programs or data bases in computer technology, which have been
found to comply with the statutory definition of a literary work.152
The DNA molecules, like the computer programs, are sets of in-
structions: "[an] engineered bacterium stores information, the
sequence of nucleotides, in the DNA double helix configuration."53
It is to be noted, however, that even if copyright protection is ap-
plicable to DNA, a donor could not claim to be its author since
"the patient exercises no conscious control over the sequence of
bases."154
The development of sophisticated technology is a "high cost,
high risk proposition.""' Those involved look for protection that
will give them the best oppportunity to get the most benefit from
their efforts."3 6 What form of protection will be chosen must be
determined by judgmental decisions based on the individual
circumstances.
VII GENETIC TEsG IN THE WoRILAcE
The issue of "genetic differences in susceptibility to disease at
150. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
151. Kayton, supra note 142, at 198.
152. Id. at 199.
153. Id.
154. OWNERSHIP OF CELLS, supra note 6, at 78.
155. Davidson & DeMay, supra note 138, at 580. The industry can only survive in a "legal
climate" in which costs and risks of research will be shared, and assure investors a return on
their investment. Id.
156. Korn, supra note 136, at 193. Universities and industrial sponsors will both benefit
from a university-industry relationship. In order for there to be an incentive to provide
funding for research, there must be protection of the invention--either in the form of licensing
or ownership of intellectual property. Id.
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work"157 raises social, political, and legal questions. It is possible to
"use direct measurement of genes to define the likelihood of
pending disease."'158 To the arsenal of the battery of objective tests
ranging from psychological to drug abuse, the applicant for
employment may now be confronted with genetic screening to
determine predisposition to specific medical ailments. 59  The
justification offered for refusal to hire those individuals testing
positive, is that employers will be protected from bearing increased
costs of payment for health insurance benefits and workers'
compensation in addition to the loss incurred from "unproductive
work"1" because of the classification of those individuals into the
high risk category. Scientific research indicates that there are over
1,600 human diseases resulting from genetic defects. 6
The genetic screening technique involves a relatively simple
procedure, requiring only a blood sample." The technician
157. Murray, The Social Context of Workplace Screening, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21
(1984). The author, a professor of ethics and public policy, comments that awareness of
genetic inherited characteristics "compels us to admit" that individuals differ in their response
to "environmental stresses" even to the extent of contracting a disease. Id.
158. Lappe, The Predictive Power of the New Genetics, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 18, 19
(1984). See Zurer, Molecular Biologists Backing Efforts to Map Entire Human Genome,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Mar. 14, 1988, at 22. A program is now being planned
which, over a fifteen-year period, will map and sequence the human genome (the complete
code). Mapping the genome entails "pinpointing the location of genes" on the chromosome;
sequencing entails the determination of the order in which the nucleotides appear on the
chromosome. Id. It is anticipated that this process will provide a means for the diagnosis
and treatment of genetic disease. See also Program to Map Entire Human Genome Urged,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Feb. 15, 1988, at 5. This program for the delineation of
the genes on each chromosome will give scientists "the ability to predict diseases arising later
in life." Id. It is further noted that this capability will present a challenge to human privacy,
as it will provide personal information, which insurance companies may well wish to have, so
as to establish insurance risks. Id.
159. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1187.
160. Id. See also Miller, Biological Monitoring The Employer's Dilemma, 9 AM. J.L. &
MED. 387, 389 (1984). One of the difficulties posed by industry is the pinpointing of
"threshold limit values of exposure to industrial poisons that will protect most workers and
still achieve maximum efficiency." Id.
161. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1199.
162. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN THE
PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, OTA-BA-194 (1983) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL].
Blood serves as a source of body fluid which is readily obtainable, the assumption being that
"blood reflects events happening in other parts of the body." Id. at 54.
NOTES
determines the genetic pattern of the individual and looks for "the
presence of inherited traits" that will signal susceptibility to certain
diseases.1" Thus, an individual may be denied employment on the
mere possibility of a future disability.1" From another outlook, it
may be deemed helpful to an aspiring employee to be advised of a
future health problem in cases where certain types of employment
might hasten or bring on this potential illness.1' Although a would-
be employee may exercise his option to seek employment elsewhere,
this choice is one that is easier to make in a financial climate in
which employment is readily available.'"
Currently there are four areas of testing used to screen out
individuals with genetic profiles predicting susceptibility to (1)
carcinogenic industrial chemicals, (2) sickle cell anemia, (3)
hemolytic anemia, and (4) predisposition to pulmonary diseases upon
exposure to respiratory irritants.167
Carcinogenic screening tests are particularly useful to the
chemical and petrochemical t" industries, where toxic chemicals are
163. Severo, Genetic Tests by Industry Raise Questions on Rights of Workers, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1980, at Al, col. 1. See OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 57.
164. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1187-88. See Murray, supra note 157, at 21-23. One
commentator has reflected on the impact of other than genetic factors, such as environment
and diet. Id.
165. OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 59. In these predictive tests, attention should be
directed to the "relative risk" that the genetic trait will result in the likelihood of the
individual developing the illness. Id. The relative risk calculation is derived from the ratio
of the "incidence of disease among nonexposed persons divided by the same ratio among
nonexposed persons." Id.
166. Macklin, Mapping the Human Genone: Problems of Privacy and Free Choice, in
GENEnCS III, supra note 2, at 107, 109. From a practical point of view, the alternative of
seeking employment in a different company, or another kind of work, is not always available.
The factors include poverty, little schooling, lack of marketable skills, and 'limited mobility,"
which may constrain many individuals. Id.
167. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1203-11. See also OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at
53; DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1981). A carcinogen is "any
cancer-producing substance." Id. at 220. A carcinogenic produces carcinogen. Id. A
hemolytic causes a separation of the hemoglobin from the red blood cells. 1d. at 595.
Pulmonary relates to the lungs. Id. at 1094.
168. Petrochemical refers to chemicals which are produced from petroleum or natural gas.
McGRAw HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE & TECHNICAL TERMS, 1192 (3d ed. 1981).
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prevalent." Critics of the predictive screening tests as a means to
"protect workers"t"0 view this program as "an employment philosophy
that would label a particular group of people as unfit for certain
jobs because of their genetic makeup."171 It has been proposed that
a more productive approach to industrial toxic conditions would be
to "clean . . . up the workplace.""r The contention is that, as all
employees in industries utilizing potentially hazardous chemicals are
exposed to the same toxic atmosphere and are thus as vulnerable to
its dangers as those deemed to be highly susceptible, it is more
desirable to seek measures to reduce the "degree of toxic exposure
in the workplace" for all employees."
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964174 and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines 75 have
been determined by the courts to serve the purpose of removing
artificial barriers to employment "which historically served to
discriminate on the basis of race or any other class characteristics."76
The possibility exists that, under the guise of testing for genetically
induced disability, the employer may actually be practicing
discriminatory hiring practices." Because certain genetic traits are
found primarily in particular ethnic groups, genetic screening
169. Severo, supra note 163, at col. 1. It was reported that some petrochemical companies
tested thousands of employees in a program designed to relate "defective" genes with people
hypersusceptible to industrial chemicals. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at col. 2.
172. Id. The focus should shift from the exclusion of susceptible, high-risk employees to
"emphasis on cleaning up the workplace" of industrial poisons. Id.
173. Id. at col. 1. Former Occupational Safety and Health Administration director, Eula
Bingham, stated that industrial genetic screening is an attempt to place the burden of
controlling toxic substances on their employees "rather than on companies who should be
cleaning up the workplace for all." Id. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1976
(OSHA) imposes a general duty on employers to maintain a safe environment in the
workplace, free from occupational health hazards. Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA)
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982).
176. Note, Genetic Testing in Employment: Employee Protection or Threat?, 15 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 1187, 1197 (1981).
177. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1188
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presents the employer with the oportunity to refuse employment to
applicants exhibiting traits characteristic of a specific class." By
legislative intent, the "promise of Title VII is equal employment
opportunity for all regardless of their immutable traits.""9
A striking example of this potential for discriminatory
employment exclusion based on genetic traits involves sickle cell
anemia, a condition found to exist almost exclusively among
American Blacks." It is suggested that the exclusion of genetically
screened job applicants exhibiting the sickle cell trait "implies racial
overtones""' and may be characterized as a discrete form of
discrimination.18
Title VII would appear to be equally applicable in cases
178. OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 124. See Murray, supra note 157, at 22-23.
Professor Murray, citing, S.J. GouwD, THE MEASURE OF MAN (1983), in which an attack is
made on scientific means being used to "explain and justify unequal regard and treatment for
people who deviate from the 'ideal' standard: the adult Caucasian male". Murray, supra note
157, at 22-23. Professor Murray proceeds to analogize workplace genetic screening to the
scientific intelligence measurements cited by Gould, and notes that "[b]oth efforts concentrate
on presumably heritable traits with genetic bases, linked to individual and group differences
including differences among races and ethnic groups." Id. at 23.
179. Note, supra note 176, at 1197.
180. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1205.
181. Id. Some states have enacted legislation specifically prohibiting the denial of
employment or discharge from employment of any individual solely on the basis of having the
sickle cell trait. Id.
182. Id. at 1205, 1207. The author discusses two cases in which there were references to
sickle cell trait and Title VII, in a hypothetical context. EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 635
F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); Narragansett Electric Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human
Rights, 118 R.I. 457, 374 A.2d 1022 (1977). In Greyhound Lines a Black employee suffered
from a disease which "predominantly affects black males" from which relief was afforded by
growing a beard. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d at 189. The majority decision held that the no
beard policy of the employer did not impose a form of discrimination. Id. at 195. The
dissent, however, commented that in the situation of an employer who disqualified job
applicants exhibiting sickle cell traits, the court would find a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. at 200 (Sloviter, J. dissenting).
Although the second case, Narragansett Electric Co., involved claims of sexual
discrimination, the court noted in dicta that the use of screening for sickle cell traits would
constitute a clearly discriminatory act since a non-racial basis for failure to hire was not
avaliable. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1207 (citing Narragansett Electric Co., 118 R.I. at
466, 374 A.2d at 1026).
The author of the article concludes that the reasoning in these two cases is an indication
that any ban on hiring, based on a finding of sickle cell trait, would be considered a violation
of Title VII. Matthewman supra note 8, at 1207-08.
190 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. VI
involving individuals who have been found to have a deficiency of
Glucose-6-Phosphate Dehydrogenase (G-6-PD) caused by a genetic
defect."t This deficiency results in predisposition to a severe form
of anemia (hemolytic anemia) when victims are exposed to certain
industrial chemicals.1" As in the case of sickle cell anemia, this
condition has an ethnic basis; it is found primarily in American
Black males, Mediterranean Jews, and Filipinos.1'
Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain at this time whether Title
VII concerns may be raised by the screening for alpha-antitrypsin
(AAT) deficiency. 8  Presently, there is no conclusive evidence that
any specific ethnic group displays this deficiency,87 which is believed
to be responsible for a propensity to pulmonary and liver disease."
Although there is no specific definition for discrimination under
183. OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 11. G-6-PD is an enzyme, the production of which
is controlled by a single gene; the deficiency arises due to a variation in the form of the gene.
Id. at 90. It is a sex-linked genetic condition found on the "X" chromosome. Id. Females
have two of the "X" chromosomes, whereas males have only one. G-6-PD deficiencies are
found primarily in men. Id.
An enzyme is a protein present in a cell which accelerates, by its catalytic action, the
chemical reaction of a specific substance. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 526
(26th ed. 1981).
X and Y chromosomes: The human DNA is found in segments called chromosomes. In
addition to two copies of each of twenty-two chromosomes, there are two sex chromosomes.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HUMAN GENE THERAPY, A BACKGROUND PAPER, BP-
BA-32, at 13 (1984) [hereinafter THERAPY] Two X chromosomes are found in the female,
whereas the male has one X and one Y chromosome. Therefore, in normal human cells,
there are a total of 46 chromosomes derived from the germ cells (sperm and egg). Id. The
egg or ovum consists of twenty-two chromosomes plus one X chromosome, and the sperm
consists of twenty-two chromosomes plus either an X or Y chromosome. Id. During
fertilization, the sperm and egg join to provide a total of forty-six chromosomes; if the sperm
has an X chromosome, a female is produced, and if it has a Y chromosome, a male is
produced. Id.
184. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1208. The red blood cell membranes of people with
G-6-PD deficiencies break down when exposed to a wide range of industrial or environmental
oxidants. Most of the data relating to G-6-PD deficiency is based on in-vitro (not performed
on humans) laboratory studies. OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 91.
185. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1209 n.144.
186. Id. at 1209, 1211.
187. This deficiency has been related to diseases affecting the lungs and liver. Id. See also
OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 93 (discussion of predisposition to emphysema, caused by
the deficiency of serum alpha antitrypsin (SAT)).
188. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1210. There may, however, be a higher prevalence of
this deficiency to be found in people of Central European ancestry. Id.
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Title VII,'" the Supreme Court has ascribed to two forms of
employment discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate
impact."9  The disparate treatment theory requires proof of
discriminatory motive on the part of the employer 9 and it must be
established that a challenged screen test was intended to "treat some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."'" Disparate impact, on the other
hand, requires no proof of discriminatory motive and is based on the
adoption of a facially neutral criteria for employment that,
nevertheless, has a disproportionate effect on one group. 93
189. OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 123 (citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349
F. Supp. 235, 238 (C.D. Cal. 1972)). Baker presented a definition of "a failure to treat all
persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and
those not favored." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a sex discrimination case,
the Supreme Court set forth criteria for proving intent to discriminate in disparate treatment
cases. To establish intent to discriminate the plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a
protected class, (2) qualification for job for which employer was seeking applicants, (3)
rejection despite qualifications, and (4) position remained open and other applicants with
plaintiff's qualifications were still being sought. Id. at 802.
193. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court ruled on the
question of whether an employer was proscribed by Title VII from making employment
conditional on having a high school education or passing a standardized intelligence test when:
(1) these standards are not significantly related to job performance, (2) the standards tend
to result in the disqualification of a high percentage of Blacks as compared to whites, and (3)
the job had been previously filled only by whites. Id. at 426.
The Court noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 703(h), permits the
administration of professionally prepared preemployment tests as long as the tests are job
related and do not discriminate on the basis of sex, religion, race, or national origin. Grigs,
401 U.S. at 434. "'he Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also the practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
The issue of employee testing was again addressed by the Supreme Court in Albermarle
Paper Co., v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), where the testing program entailed a requirement
for a high school level education and the passing of two tests, one verbal and one non-verbal.
Id. at 411. Citing Grigs and McDonnell Douglas, the Court ruled that the plaintiff made out
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the "tests in question select applicants
for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of
applicants." Id. at 425. In a restatement of Griggs, the opinion held that the tests must be
shown by the employer to be manifestly related to the job performance. Id. Further, if the
employer succeeded in proving job relationship of the tests, the plaintiff had to put forward
different tests or other means which would serve as well without having any negative racial
effect. Id. The presentation of such alternatives "would be evidence that the employer was
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In assessing the applicability of Title VII to genetic screening
of employees, two issues need to be resolved: whether such testing
constitutes a "selection criteria within the purview of Title VII"'
t
and, if it is found to be so, "whether discrimination can be
established."t9
The definition of testing measures, as defined in the Uniform
Guidelines of EEOC, encompasses genetic screening."9  Thus, if
genetic screening is revealed as having a disparate impact by reason
of race, as in the case of sickle cell anemia and G-6-PD, a prima
facie case of discrimination would be established, thereby satisfying
Title VII criteria."9 The burden is then shifted to the employer,
using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." Id.
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), considered the "bottom-line" theory of defense
in a suit for violation of Title VII. The defendant argued that this defense would protect an
employer, where employees were barred from promotions because of examinations having a
disparate impact if the end result was a racially balanced promotion listing. Id. at 442. Thus,
in an examination for promotion, Blacks were found to have a lower percentage of pass rates
than did the other groups. Id. at 443. However, when the promotions were granted, Blacks
had a greater percentage of acceptances than did the white applicants.
The Court reaffirmed GriW: "A non-job-related test that has a disparate racial impact,
and is used to 'limit' or 'classify' employees, is 'used to discriminate' within the meaning of
Title VII, whether or not it was 'designed or intended' to have this effect and despite
employers efforts to compensate for its discriminatory effect." Id. at 452. The Court held
the bottom-line defense to be invalid against a prima facie case of discriminatory intent. Id.
at 452.
The dissent commented on the inconsistency of this decision with previous holdings of
the Court since disparate treatment cases target the treatment accorded an individual, whereas
the disparate impact case focuses on the protected group. Id. at 457 (Powell, J. dissenting).
The question revolves around the result of the "total selection process" and based on the
figures no finding of unfavorable disparate impact could be made. Id. at 458.
194. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1211. See McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented
Employment Screening, 59 TEX. L REv. 999, 1049 (1981).
195. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1211.
196. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. §
1607.16(Q) (1987), in which selection procedure is defined as any measure, combination of
measures, or procedures used as a basis for any employment decision. Matthewman, supra
note 8, at 1212.
197. OCCUPATIONAL, supra note 162, at 124. The adverse impact on Blacks in the case of
sickle cell trait is clearly indicated by the statistical information showing an overwhelming
number of Blacks as compared to Whites have the sickle cell trait. Id. The ratio of Black
carriers to White carriers is 83 to 1. Id.
In the case of G-6-PH deficiency, a statistical survey revealed the frequency of this trait
is 16% in Blacks and 12-13% in Filipinos as compared to 0.1% for Whites. Id.
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who can offer justification for the tests by resorting to the two
defenses of "business necessity" and "job relatedness."'" Business
necessity relates to "general employment practice" having no bearing
on an applicant's ability to fulfill the job requirements.1  Job
relatedness refers to the qualifications of an applicant or employee
to the requirements of a specific position.'
Another potential statutory restraint on the right of employers
to use genetic screening to exclude certain individuals from
employment is found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." The Act
bars employment discrimination on the basis of a handicap.' A
qualified handicapped individual is defined in the Rehabilitation Act
as "any person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment, which
substantively limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having
such impairment."'2 3 Employment screening of qualified handicapped
198. Id. These two defenses were intertwined in Griggs where it was stated "the touchstone
is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
199. OCCUPATONAL, supra note 162, at 124. One example of business necessity defense
is the denial of employment to an individual who had been convicted of a crime. Id.
200. Id. at 124-25. The criteria for determination of applicant's capabilities is whether it
"bears a reasonable relationship to the demands of the job" as, for example, height and weight
requisites. Id. at 125.
It could be argued that business necessity could demand an employee with no health or
genetic difficulties. See Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977). Here
a black employee was fired from his job, after successfully completing his probationary period,
when an X-ray taken of his lower back indicated bone degeneration in the spine. Id. at 1284.
He sued under Title VII, however the court decided that the job required a strong back and
as such was so manifestly job related, there was no need to prove business necessity. Id. at
1288. The court commented that "an employer who had an employee with a latent back
defect is 'asking for trouble'." Id. at 1287.
201. Rehabilitation Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 701-796 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
202. OCCUPAONAL, supra note 162, at 126. In addition to the federal statute, there are
state laws, which tend to have broader coverage, prohibiting employment discrimination
against the handicapped. The federal statutes apply only to those receiving federal funding,
whereas the state laws usually apply to all employers (except small employers). Id.
203. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1987). As defined in the regulation, physical and mental
impairment is:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurolological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
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individuals must focus on the "specific job or jobs for which the
individual is being considered and shall be consistent with business
necessity and the safe performance of the job."'°  The difficulty
arises when an individual applying for a job is healthy, but through
the biological screening test is deemed to have an "elevated risk of
future disability because of exposure to a narrow class of industrial
toxins." 5  As the thrust of genetic testing is the identification of
those individuals who may become impaired in the future, due to
the special circumstances in the work area, an "important threshold
question is whether these individuals are handicapped and thereby
protected by the Rehabilitation Act."'
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Id.
A handicapped individual is "substantively" impaired if that person is "likely" to experience
difficulty in securing or advancing in employment because of a hardship. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
741.2 (1987).
204. The Supreme Court held in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
"that discriminatory tests are impermissable unless shown by professionally acceptable
methods, to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated."' Id. at 431 (citing EEOC Guidelines 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1987)).
205. Miller, supra note 160, at 414.
206. The courts have, on occasion, recognized that there could be situations when screening
out individuals with latent illness would be appropriate. In E.E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall, 497
F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980), the court suggested that there would conceivably be certain
circumstances when screening out of qualified handicapped individuals on the "basis of
possible future injury, could be both consistent with business necessity and the safe
performance of the job." Id. at 1104. This case involved an apprentice carpenter, George
Crosby, who was denied employment based on a pre-employment physical examination during
which an X-ray disclosed a congenital back injury, which was deemed by the examining
physician to make him a poor risk for heavy labor. Id. at 1091. Mr. Crosby filed a complaint
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), with the
Department of Labor. Id. at 1092. The decision of the Assistant Secretary of Labor stated
that, because Crosby was currently able to work, "a potential for future significance" could not
be used to disqualify him from the job. Id. at 1095. When the case finally went up for
judicial review, the court rejected this interpretation as overbroad. Id. at 1099. The court,
however, did not set up any legal standards to determine when there would be a basis for
rejection of a qualified handicapped individual possessing a potential risk of future illness or
injury. Id. at 1104.
In Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982), a diabetic
employee was discharged because high sugar levels caused him to be absent from his job and
increased his susceptibility to infection. Id. at 620. The court, finding no connection between
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The practice of instituting genetic -testing to be used in a
predictive manner, by selecting who will or will not be permitted
entry into the workplace, presents both positive and negative facets.
"Social reality"' impels us to recognize the entitlement of the
employer to obtain the most productive work force in ways "that
allow cost savings no matter how discriminatory or prejudicial the
process."' We cannot, however, ignore the "tension between
biological facts and the imperatives of morality ... as we grapple
with the question of what to do about genetic differences in
susceptibility to disease at work."' A molecular biologist at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has referred to genetic testing
as a form of "scientific racism."21 In criticizing the screening
program instituted by the Du Pont Company, he commented: " ..
. people are not going to get sick because they are hypersusceptible;
they are going to get sick because they are being poisoned." '211 In
the final assessment of the value of industrial genetic screening,
however, it should be acknowledged that, as the sophistication and
precision of biological testing techniques increase, "their predictive
value and usefulness should escalate accordingly."1
IX. GENE THERAPY
Genetic testing, outside the sphere of screening for the
workplace, can serve as a diagnostic tool for the researcher and the
the controlled sugar levels and safe performance on the job, ordered back pay. Id. at 623.
However, the opinion also stated that it was not holding that "a non-imminent risk of injury
cannot justify rejecting a handicapped individual." Id. at 623 n.3; Miller, supra note 160, at
414-15.
207. Lappe, supra note 158, at 21.
208. Id.
209. Murray, supra note 157, at 21.
210. Matthewman, supra note 8, at 1205 n.120.
211. Severo, supra note 163, at A36, col. 5. Dr. Jonathan King, a molecular biologist at
M.I.T., further expresses the belief that by instituting these testing programs, industry is
embarking "on a major effort to deflect the issue of toxic substances in the work place and
the environment." Id. He feels that testing relieves the company of the need for a clean up
program, as it is cheaper to have a screening program than to lower the toxic levels of
dangerous chemicals. Id.
212. Miller, supra note 160, at 407.
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physician. 13 Genetic screening for purposes of health care is
targeted to three areas: (1) looking for disease in the newborn, (2)
prenatal diagnosis through fetal screening, and (3) identification of
carriers of the genetic defect which may be passed on to future
generations. 14 Once the defective gene responsible for the disease
is located, the proposed method of treatment to cure the ailment is
to introduce "a normal functioning gene into a cell" in which its
defective counterpart is causing the problem.215 Gene therapy will
therefore provide the means for treatment of the illness "at the level
of the mutant gene itself."2 6
Ongoing research in the area of prenatal diagnosis has produced
some of the most dramatic developments in the new genetic
technology.2"7 By using gene "probes"2"8 it has become possible to get
precise "estimates of the liklihood of disease that might be crippling
or impairing." '219 The techniques used for the sampling of the fetal
213. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 2-3, 38-41.
214. Rowley, Genetic Screening: Marvel or Menace?, 225 SCIENCE, July 13, 1984, at 138.
There are at least three important differences between genetic and nongenetic screening. (1)
In the traditional testing procedures, the people identified as being at risk may lead to others
who had physical contact with them, and they may also be at risk, whereas in genetic
screening the identification of others at risk is determined through familial relationships. Id.
(2) Concern in ordinary health screening is directed to the individual being tested, but in
genetic screening, the concern is directed to subject's offspring. Id. (3) Genetic screening
imposes "an inherent risk of impairing self-image and perceived suitability as a marriage
partner or parent." Id.
215. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 42. The technique can almost be regarded as a
definition of gene therapy. It is not primarily directed towards alleviating the symptons
brought about by the defective gene. It seeks to correct the defect and thus cure the disease.
Id.
216. Gage, supra note 13, at 200-01. The usual therapeutic approach involves the
alleviation of the symptoms by removal of or replacement of a damaged organ or by
restricting dietary intake. Id.
217. Lappe, supra note 158, at 19. Some of the hereditary ailments which have been
identified via genetic screening are: Factors VIII and IX deficiency (pertaining to the clotting
system); the hemoglobinopathics (such as sickle cell, thalassemia and hemoglobin C disease);
phenylketonuria; muscular dystrophy. Id.
218. E. SYLVFSTER & L. KLOrz, supra note 3, at 15. Segments of DNA have been
identified, and are used to "probe" for their counterpart segment in the subject being tested.
The extreme sensitivity and specificity of the DNA probes to the targeted area make them
excellent diagnostics tools. Id. at 15.
219. Lappe, supra note 158, at 19.
1988] NOTES 197
cells for genetic analysis are amniocentesis and chorionic villi. °
Because chorionic villi is still a new procedure, the National
Institutes of Health plans to conduct a study to evaluate its efficacy
and safety, in which approximately 2,500 women are expected to
participate."1 This testing will give rise to ethical questions as to the
selection of the subjects, the balancing of the risks and benefits, and
informed consent.'
The great risk inherent in prenatal gene therapy is that there
will be "genetic changes that may be inherited by future
220. Id. at 19. In amniocentesis, the sample is removed from the amniotic fluid by
insertion of a needle into the placenta. Id. Chorionic villi sampling is obtained with the use
of ultrasound imaging and a catheter passed into the uterus, from which tissue is removed by
suction. Id. Amniocentesis testing cannot be done until the sixteenth week of pregnancy,
whereas chorionic testing can be performed during the first eight to ten weeks. Id. The
results of the chorionic tests are available within hours as compared to amniocentesis, which
takes about two weeks. Id.
221. Id. See also Fletcher & Schulman, supra note 101, at 6. The chorionic villi sampling
technique was introduced into the United States without any federal support. The feasibility
studies were generally done on villi obtained for diagnostic purposes from women who elected
to undergo first trimester abortions. Id. at 8.
222. Steinbrook, In California, Voluntary Mass Prenatal Screening, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
5 (1986). An example of the kinds of problems to be encountered in a large scale testing
program is the voluntary prenatal screening program carried out in California. Id. The
campaign was directed at the detection of a neural tube defect in the fetus, which results in
two severe forms of birth defects. Id. One type is anencephaly, an incomplete brain or skull,
which is always fatal shortly after birth. The other type is spina bifida, an opening in the
bones around the spinal cord, causing mild to severe conditions which may include mental
retardation, leg paralysis, lack of bladder and bowel control. Id. The severity or mildness
is dependent on the location of the lesion. Children born with the less severe forms may be
helped by corrective surgery. Id.
The testing involves taking a sample of the maternal serum, found in amniotic fluid,
which is analyzed for the presence of alpha fetoprotein (a protein found in the early stages
of fetal life). Id. Researchers have established a relationship between elevated levels of alpha
fetoprotein in the amniotic fluid and the incidence of neural tube defect in the fetus. Id. at
5-6.
The program is voluntary, and pregnant women who apply sign a statement of informed
consent, containing a phrase indicating that the signer understands the nature of the defect,
and the purpose of the testing. There is an additional phrase stating: "I understand that if
the fetus is found to have a birth defect, the decision whether to continue or terminate the
pregnancy will be entirely mine." Id. at 7. See also Rowley, supra note 214, at 143, for a
discussion of the psychological and ethical considerations of genetic screening as well as the
legal aspects.
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generations."' As has been noted by a member of Harvard Medical
School's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, a line must be
drawn between medical and eugenic' uses:
The real long-term danger is that genetic engineering might
be used not only for therapy but also to improve" or
blueprint people, according to somebody's plan .... While
the range of conceivable efforts is broader for germ line
intervention, the important line to draw is that between
medical and eugenic uses, rather than between somatic and
germ line cells.'
The distinction, however, is not so clear since "no obvious line
exists that separates curing a 'defect' from enhancing a
characteristic."' The prevailing question overlying gene therapy is
the determination of what constitutes a genetic defect. Failure to
answer this may lead to situations where "gene therapy may be used
to medically 'cure' many genotypes 7 that give rise to phenotypes'
that from religious, social, or ethical perspectives are not necessarily
defects."'
The problem also arises, as more distinctions between
individuals are presented by more refined genetic techniques, that
"certain human defects or problems might now, and in the future,
223. Gage, supra note 13, at 204-05. As the gene enters the germ line (reproductive), the
trait may be passed on to future generations. If it enters the somatic line (non-productive)
it dies with the individual and is not passed on. Id. See also SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at
46.
224. Eugenics is "a science that deals with the improvement (as by control of human
mating) of hereditary qualities of a race or breed." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY
390 (1981). Eugenics is distinct from euthenics which deals with improvement through
environment. Id. at 391.
225. Gage, supra note 13, at 213 (quoting Davis, Cells and Souls, N.Y. Times, June 28,
1983, at A27, col. 2).
226. Gage, supra note 13, at 213.
227. Genotype is defined as "the entire genetic constitution of an individual." DORLANDS
ILLUSTRAED MEDICAL DICrONARY 546 (26th ed. 1981).
228. Phenotype concerns "the entire physical, biochemical, and physiological makeup of an
individual as determined both genetically and environmentally." Id. at 1005.
229. Gage, supra note 13, at 213.
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be attributed to genetic origins even if social or environmental
factors would be more appropriate for blame."'  Additionally, if and
when gene therapy becomes a recognized and practical procedure,
the medical profession will be faced with increased risks of medical
malpractice suits for failure to detect fetal disorders and to remedy
them. t
Gene therapy creates the possibility that, through this
technique, many children will be born free of the diseases which
would have debilitated them. Difficult decisions will have to be
made by doctors and parents for the unborn child, 22  thus
emphasizing the increasing need for informed consent based on full
disclosure. 3  On a broader base, there is the spectre of bringing
230. Id. at 213-14. There are "social or environmental factors" contributing to the specific
characteristic. Id. As an example, reference was made to the controversy which had arisen
over "XYY" males. It was "mistakenly" presumed to be an indication of the presence of
criminal tendencies. Id. The normal genetic makeup of the male consists of XY
chromosome; in this condition, an extra Y chromosome is present, and there were several
abortions to "prevent the birth of potential criminals." Id. One commentator noted that the
consequence of this theory was that "[s]ociety diverted energy from eliminating environmental
conditions which bred crime to medical methods thought to be effective in reducing the
number of criminals." Id.
231. See Shin, The Fetus As Patient: A Philosophical and Ethical Perspective, in GENErICS
III, supra note 2, at 317. If genetic therapy was available and a child was born defective, will
there be a lawsuit for malpractice brought against the attending physician for his failure to
inform the parents of the option of gene therapy? Alternatively, the question is asked
whether a wrongful life action may be brought against a mother who refuses the fetal therapy
deemed dangerous to her but might have been of help to the fetus. Id. at 323.
232. Gage, supra note 13, at 214. The fetus on whom the gene therapy is to be performed
is unable to participate in the "decision making process"; the decision made by the parents
and doctors may have an effect not only on the fetus under discussion, but conceivably on
future generations. Id. There is always the possibility that the elected gene therapy may
result in the transmittal of a specific gene alteration. Id. at 323.
233. Rowley, supra note 214, at 143. The psychological impact of this decision-making
process has to be recognized. There is a need to refine the means of "communicating risk
information based upon a better understanding of how individuals deal with probabilities of
adverse reproductive outcomes." Id. See also Annan & Elias, Perspectives on Fetal Surgery,
in GENErICS III, supra, note 2, at 335. The authors discuss the fact that the "choice between
fetal health and maternal liberty is laced with with moral and ethical dilemmas." Id. Fetal
surgery imposes a danger to the mother, as it necessitates an invasion of her body in order
to manipulate the genes in the fetus. Id. at 361. The consent of the mother must be
informed in that she must be told in clear concise language what the proposed procedure
entails and the risks to both her and the fetus. She must also be told about alternatives, what
the success and failure rates are, as well as the "likely problems of recuperation." Id. at 355.
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about a change in the "genetic makeup of human society as a whole,
thereby altering the human gene pool."'
How this new powerful tool will be regulated places an awesome
responsibility on those who will have to make the decisions.
X CONSm=ONAL ISSUES
As the United States Constitution enters the third century of
its existence, it will again have the opportunity to prove its resiliency
to the changes wrought by the scientific and technological advances,
by remaining a "strong bulwark against abuse of both political and
technological power."35  The Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA), an arm of Congress, in its reports on science, technology,
and the Constitution, is developing the basic premise that we "are
moving into an era in which information, in all of its varied forms,
has become the agent of vast social and scientific change."'
The OTA elaborates on this concept by pointing out that a
"central theme in all fields of science and technology is radical
improvement in our ability to gather, store, combine, and use
information--especially information about people." 7 Biotechnology
has contributed to this information pool by the improved techniques
developed for genetic definition and identification of individuals.
Information about people can be used to influence and control
them, as well as open up questions in the "sphere of personal
autonomy and privacy."'  The Bill of Rights and Civil War
234. Gage, supra note 13, at 214-15. With the new techniques of biotechnology, it will be
possible to remove certain genes as well as to enhance existing genes, and thus change the
human gene pool. Id. at 215.
235. CONSrrlON, supra note 11, at 1.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2. Once the scientific information becomes available, the determination of how
to "translate" it into public policy "involves certain tensions to which the Constitution speaks."
Id.
238. Id. Biotechnology has provided science with the tools whereby information can be
derived from an individual's physiological and physical patterns. Id. This would include the
information attained be genetic studies and screening procedures, generating information
about present body conditions as well as potential future physical developments. The conflict
between individual rights and the general welfare may have to be resolved when "questions
as to whom to test and how to use the results of testing" arises in response to possible
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Amendments are integral to the identification of the issues evolving
from the technological advances as they affect people and
goverment. 9
The first amendment,' because of its prohibition of
government intervention in the "most basic elements of our
democracy--the expression of thought, opinion and belief,"241 is
regarded as the guardian of academic freedom. The concept of
scientific research being constitutionally protected relies on the
recognition that the fundamental nature of scientific inquiry, in its
search for scientific information, is closely allied to and follows in
the tradition of academic freedom.242 Scientific experimentation has
been described as a form of speech "essential to the exposition of
scientific ideas" and therefore meriting first amendment protection.243
dangers to the public. Id.
239. Id. at 10. The Bill of Rights include the first ten amendments to the Constitution and
are generally regarded as limiting only the powers of the Federal Goverment. Id. The
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, issued after the Civil War and known as the
Civil War Amendments, relate only to restrictions imposed on the States. Through judicial
interpretation, however, the Bill of Rights has been incorporated into these three amendments
and now applies to the States as well. Id. See also Seltzer, Advances in Science and
Technology Challenge Constitution's Principles, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 19, 1987,
at 7. The director of the Office of Technology Assessment has commented that "[b]y
changing the ways in which we interact with one another, science and technology often affect
the way in which we define the general welfare, the way in which we view the realm of
government, and the nature of the rights we exercise as American citizens." 1d.
240. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances." Id.).
241. CONSTTtIrnON, supra note 11, at 10.
242. Bereano, Book Review, 227 JURIMETRICS J. 229 (1987) (reviewing I. CARMEN, CLONING
AND THE CONSTrtrrTON (1985)). The creation of academic freedom and scientific research
was expounded in a policy statement of the American Civil Liberties Union (policy #66,
1977), wherein it was stated "Freedom of inquiry in the pursuit of scientific knowledge is thus
closely allied to freedom of speech and publication as well as to the traditional academic
pursuit, articulation and dissemination of knowledge in general." Id. at 232.
243. CARMEN, supra note 117, at 40. The author maintains that, although the Supreme
Court Justices have not specifically addressed the position of the scientist in relation to the
Constitution, their comments regarding "interpersonal communication in the educational
setting" supports his contention that scientific research is constitutionally protected. Id at 37.
The author deems it "incomprehensible that classroom associations receive a higher degree
of per se constitutional protection than laboratory associations." Id. In furtherance of his
conviction that scientific investigation merits first amendment protection, Carmen theorizes
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There are individuals who depict science as a beneficent force
that is not to be interfered with by government or social and
religious institutions.2 Because of the manipulative nature of
recombinant DNA research, the ethical concerns surrounding fetal
research, and the potential threat to public health and safety by the
release of human altered microorganisms into the environment,
governmental restrictions and regulations have been instituted.245
The question arises as to whether these limitations on research
infringe on the scientists' first amendment rights to freedom of
inquiry. It is the prevailing opinion that "scientific activity has
general protection, subject to limitations where a clear national
interest is involved."2" When the scientific and technological
activities pose a risk to national security, the government does
restrain such scientific endeavors. 7 This may be accomplished by
refusing funding, demanding secrecy as a condition for obtaining
that freedom of expression encompasses more than just words. It includes "ideas, attitudes,
values, and emotions." Id. at 40. He further proposed that inasmuch as "experimentation is
,expressive activity' it is "conduct central to speech." Id. Therefore, scientific investigation
is "essential to the exposition of scientific ideas" because it is "the only way researchers can
test and substantiate their theories" Id.
244. Bereano, supra note 242, at 232. The problemetical issue, however, is the
determination of the point at which apparently intellectually harmless experimentation
becomes a threat to public safety.
245. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 11-12. It is interesting to note that the initial concern
over the potential riskiness of recombinant DNA expermentation came from scientists actively
engaged in the research. Id. at 11. There was an assembly of such scientists at the Asilomar
conference center in California, where the imminent dangers of this research was assessed.
Id. The National Institutes of Health was entrusted with the duty to step up guidelines that
would institute measures to minimize the risks. The first guidelines were established by the
Recombinant Advisory Committee (RAC) of the National Institutes of Health. Id. at 11-
12. These guidelines have been revised several times from time to time to the present. See
infra notes 290-305 and accompanying text on regulations.
246. CONSTrtUoN, supra note 11, at 11.
247. Kolata, CIA Director Warns Scientists, 215 SCIENCE, Jan. 22, 1982, at 383. Appearing
before a symposium on "Striking a Balance: Scientific Freedom and National Security" the
deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency stated that, in a resolution of a conflict
before academic freedom and national security, Congress would act in favor of security. Id.
He noted that scientists vehemently opposing any restrictions on their absolute freedom to
publish will, nevertheless, have no compunction about entering into trade secret arrangements
with corporations to withhold basic research information. Id. He commented that the
"Scientists' blanket of freedom" while refraining from publishing scientific results "asssume that
corporate interests are at a higher level than national security." Id.
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government financial support, denial of patents, or imposing a ban
on the publication of specific scientific topics.2'
Two other constitutional issues may arise under the first
amendment. In many instances, federal funding provides the only
source for financing research. It is conceivable that scientists may
contend they have a constitutional right to federal support for their
research since they would be deprived of the only means by which
they could proceed with their experimental investigations.24 A
second area of contention may develop in the event of the banning
or restriction of interspecies genetic exchange" or research in
248. CONSTITTN, supra note 11, at 11. The basic problem to be considered is when do
these restraints "place an intolerable burden on the exercise of the First Amendment
freedom." Id. See also Bereano, supra 242, at 238. There is an important "ancillary question"
to any consititutional inquiry as to when regulation is available: the question of the burden
of proof. Who will bear the responsibility for regulating or restricting a specific activity?
Does it fall to the investigator, the activist, or the government official? Id. It is understood
that "content bias and sociopolitical grounds are frequently involved in government decisions
about funding intellectual research. Id. However, when there is a potentially hazardous
scientific research undertaking, the "police powers of the state" may be presumed to justify
regulation. Id. at 239.
249. Seltzer, supra note 239, at 10. See generally I.H. CARMEN, supra note 117, at 45-49.
Carmen argues that as "scientific investigation" is an aspect of free expression" the denial of
federal funding is in violation of their constitutional rights. Id. at 48. He reiterates that
"Government sponsorship . . . invariably means government strings. And sometimes those
strings include even deprivation of constitutional liberty". Id. at 48.
250. THERAPY, supra note 183, at 52. Species barrier crossing involves the transplantation
of DNA material between different species. Id. Species is defined as a "community of
organisms" that through "interbreeding (exchange of genetic material" among themselves and
no others), retain their distinctive qualities. Id. See also SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 56-
60. The creation of new life forms means the production of organisms with hovel
characteristics. Historically, human beings have been creating such new life forms by the
cultivation of new characteristics in plants and by the breeding of animals with unique traits.
Gene slicing may be considered a more modern and sophisticated procedure for performing
the same function. The process "breaches species barriers" when it combines DNA from
different species through asexual reproduction. Id. One prominent scientist, commenting on
"crossing species lines," relates it to the production of tangelos by the hybridization of
tangerines and grapefruits. Id. at 56-57. Although the crossing of species lines is not
"inherently wrong," it does present some problems that are cause for concern. Id. The
organisms created by gene splicing may be capable of reproducing themselves, with the
ensuing consequences of having "self-perpetuating mistakes." Id. There is also moral aversion
to the crossing of species, specifically the mixing of human and nonhuman genes. Therefore,
it may be said that using gene splicing to cross species is not wrong of itself, but may be
wrong because of the potential consequences. Id. at 57-60.
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human cloning." It may be anticipated that researchers will
challenge the legality and constitutionality of such a ruling, as it
"stems from values that are intrinsically religous and thus violate the
'establishment clause' of the First Amendment."' 2
The right of an individual to privacy is secured by the fourth
amendment." Advanced techniques in biotechnology have provided
researchers with the capability of amassing data relating to genetic
makeup, thus "laying the foundation for a variety of public and
private information-gathering programs."z" The use to which this
information will be put gives rise to concern regarding dissemination
of this information and the possible adverse effects upon the
individuals concerned.2" Congress responded to the threat to
individual privacy resulting from the access to the large store of
information collected by the government, by enacting the Privacy
251. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 9. Cloning is the producing of genetically identical
copies of a common ancestor. Id. at 9 n.6. See also Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic
Engineering A Constitutional Assesment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476
(1974). The theoretical. technique for the cloning process for human beings entails the
removal of the nucleus, the structure which contains the chromosomes, from a female egg
(enucleation), which is replaced by the nucleus from an adult body cell of the anticipated
parent (renucleation). The egg containing the nucleus of the parent cell is then transferred
to a uterus where it will undergo normal development. The offspring will be "genetically
identical to the parent." Id. at 482-83.
252. Seltzer, supra note 239, at 10. The establishment clause refers to the first amendmnet
freedom of religion: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion
." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
254. Seltzer, supra note 239, at 12.
255. THERAPY, supra note 183, at 69-79. The new technology has made it possible to amass
a great deal of "new genetic data" relating to individuals, and has generated concerns directed
to the rights of privacy surrounding that information, and how to safeguard it from
unauthorized third party access. 1d. The potential harm to the individual whose privacy is
invaded by the disclosure of the personal genetic data ranges from social stigmatism, difficulty
in getting health and life insurance coverage, to encountering problems in obtaining
employment. Id. at 69.
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Act of 1974.56 The Act asserts that "[t]he right to privacy is a
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the
United States"2" and therefore it is the responsibility of Congress to
enact legislation to protect the autonomy of the individual from the
unwarranted disclosure of private information to third parties. 21
Genetic testing in the workplace is expected to be used more
prevalently in the future, and the possibilities of its use will
undoubtedly set the scene for suits claiming constitutional violation
of privacy5 9
256. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 &
Supp. 1988)).
257., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4); THERAPY, supra note 183, at 78-
79 (quoting from PRIVACY PROTECnON STUDY COMMISSION, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., THE
PRIVACY AND ACT OF 1974: AN ASSESSMENT, app. 4 (Comm. Print 1977)). Public policy
dictates that the rights of privacy and individual autonomy are to be balanced against the
accessibility to genetic informational data by those asserting a need for the information. Id.
at 79.
258. THERAPY, supra note 183, at 78. The advances made and to be made in information
storage and retrieval of the increasing quantity of information collected by federal agencies
is of such magnitude that to "protect the privacy of individuals identified in information
systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to
regulate the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of information by such agencies."
Id.
259. Id. The Privacy Act provides for "civil actions by aggrieved persons" against the
United States, states, and government employees, for violation of the act by improper
aquisition of information. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6 (1982). However, in the private sector
there is little protection for the employees. Some states, such as California, have required
employers to set up methods for the protection of the privacy of employee medical records.
THERAPY, supra note 183, at 78.
Employment genetic screening litigation will find precedence in case law derived from
drug screening in the workplace decisions. Illustrative of this are two recent cases which
addressed the problem of violation of privacy within the meaning of the fourth amendment
in relation to testing for use of drugs in an employment situation: Shoemaker v. Handel, 619
F. Supp. 1089 (D.NJ. 1985), and National Treasury Employees Union v. Raab, 816 F.2d 170
(5th Cir. 1987). Both cases established that fourth amendment protection extends to the
testing programs, subject to the reasonableness of the procedure without violation of due
process, and state interest in public health and safety. These two decisions relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the issue
of whether compulsory administration of a blood test violated the search and seizure provision
of the fourth amendment. The Court made a two tier analysis: the first step was a
determination that the compulsory tests "plainly constitute searches of 'persons', and depend
antecedently upon seizures of 'persons' .... " Id. at 767. In the second tier of its analysis
the Court stated the "Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all
intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified under the circumstances, or
which are made in an improper manner." Id. at 768.
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The Constitution is vigilant in protecting the rights of persons
suspected, accused, or convicted of criminal activity.' These rights,
secured through the provisions of the fifth, 1 sixth, 2 and eighth'
amendments, have their basis in the conviction that people have
"free will or self-determination."' This constitutional premise is
being challenged by the increasing evidence that there is a "growing
possibility that biochemical and genetic research will identify
determinants of (or strong forces on) criminal behavior that are
beyond the control of the offender .... "I If further research
enforces this presumption, concepts of punishment and rehabilitation
would have to be reconsidered and evaluated by the courts and
legislatures.'
260. CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 17. The Constitution "forbids capricious governmental
actions," in the deprivation of an individual's "life, liberty, or property." Id., U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
261. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on indictment of a Grand Jury .... ; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himselfnor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
Id.
262. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury ... , and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; ..., and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
263. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.).
264. Seltzer, supra note 239, at 12. See also Note, supra note 251, at 476. The author
focuses on the cloning of individuals, which he considers to be within the realm of
probability, and its constitutional ramifications. Id. at 481, 488-582. However, he notes that
the analysis of the topic is applicable to other techniques of genetic engineering "being
developed for intervention into human nature." Id. at 479. He also comments on the
"sanctity of individuality". Id. at 507.
265. CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 14-15.
266. Id. If an individual is considered to be acting out of his own volition, that individual
"can be punished for the crime or can be offered the opportunity for rehabilitation." Id. at
16. Whereas, if the person accused of the crime had no control over his actions, because of
predetmined genetic factors, to subject that person to punishment would be in contradiction
to the spirit of the Constitution. A technological alternative to prison, such as techniques
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The seventh amendment provides for the right to a jury trial
in civil suits.67 Because of the complexity of issues arising in cases
involving biotechnology and genetic engineering, the facts of the
case may be beyond the understanding of a lay person, resulting in
equity trials without jury.'
The thirteenth amendment, prohibiting slavery or involuntary
servitude,' also serves to bar the patenting of a human being as
aimed at "behavior modification" may face the challenge of the eighth amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII; CONSTIUTION,
supra note 11, at 16. The "reliability of informed consent" obtained for this treatment would
be questionable when the option is between therapy and prison. Id. at 14-15.
267. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law.
Id.
268. The Eighth Annual Judicial Conference, 92 F.R.D. 181 (1981). At a patent and
trademark conference, a panel of three judges and three attorneys involved in patent and
trademark litigation addressed a problem concerning the use of jury trials in complex patent
litigation. Id. at 275-77. One of the panelists, Judge Hill, United States District Judge of the
Northern District of Texas, stated that, in most cases, juries are qualified to follow the
complexities of the case. In difficult cases, he has "appointed a master" to aid the jury in
understanding some intricate areas. He qualified his response, somewhat, by stating that he
could "conceive of some cases that could not be tried." Id. at 275-76. Judge Connor, United
States District Judge of the Southern District of New York, explained that some cases are so
complex, they "are better tried to a judge." Id. at 276.
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), asserts that the issues in a case may be so
complex as to be considered beyond the competency of a jury. Id. at 538 n.10. Three factors
are to be considered in deciding whether an issue is legal or equitable: "[als our cases
indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger
custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical
abilities and limitations of juries." Id.
The Supreme Court ruled in Dairy Queen v Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), a trademark
case, that a cause of action usually recognized as one at law may be bought in equity without
a jury "if the accounts between the parties" were of such a "complicated nature" that only a
"court of equity could unravel them." Id. at 478. However, In re Financial Secs. Litig., 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) held that it was preferable to use a master rather than deny the
seventh amendment right to a jury. Id. at 428. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (explanation of the
term master).
269. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Id. "Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. at § 2.
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one human being cannot own another.'" The state of the art in
genetic engineering has not as yet progressed to the stage where it
is possible to produce a human being through the cloning271 process,
and probably never will. The concept of "genetic bondage""z  has
been introduced to serve as a euphemism for the "deliberate
imposition of a predetermined identity by one person (e.g. a genetic
'engineer') upon another (e.g. a clonant), which results in the
dimunition of one's external autonomy, raises an issue of 'badges of
slavery' under the thirteenth amendment."' The relevancy of the
thirteenth amendment to biotechnological techniques as applied to
humans is predicated on the proposition that there is a
constitutional guarantee against the imposition of the "badge of
slavery" by either state or private action.2 74
The fourteenth amendment offers protection through the equal
protection clause and the due process of law clause.275 Modern
270. Genetic Engineering: Battle Rages on Patenting Animals, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEws, June 22, 1987, at 4. In response to the furor aroused by the announcement of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that it would consider animals to be patentable subject
matter, the PTO stated emphatically that no consideration would be given to patents on
humans. The pronouncement stated that "Grant of a limited, but exclusive, property right
in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution' under the 13th Amendment (forbidding
slavery)." Id.
271. THERAPY, supra note 183, at 11 n.7. The cloning of an entire organism such as a
human being entails copying all of a cell's DNA to create a new organism identical to the
original. See also supra note 251.
272. Note, supra note 251, at 517.
273. Id. at 517-18. A "badge of slavery" refers to the incident or vestige of a slavery
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment. BLACKs LAw DICTIONARY 127 (5th ed. 1979) (defining
badges of servitude and also citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1960)). In
Jones, a congressional statute prohibiting housing discrimination was held to be valid on the
basis that this type of discrimination "was a badge or incident of slavery." Jones, 392 U.S. at
441. This decision has been interpreted as extending the protection of the thirteenth
amendment to "many types of civil freedom." Note, supra note 251, at 518.
274. Note, supra note 251, at 517-19.
275. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
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interpretation of these protective clauses has sheltered Americans
against discrimination based on race, alienage, and gender." 6
However, as science reveals the genetic components of ability and
aptitude, "it may be possible to identify not only what is common to
all human beings, but also what is different."'" If scientific studies
should establish genetic characteristics belonging to specific
categories of people, we may well be confronted with "constitutional
dilemmas between moral values and scientific truth."'27 The possible
application of the knowledge acquired has called into question
whether the new technology will "reinforce or perhaps exacerbate
existing social, cultural, and economic equalities."29  Science may
demand a different articulation of equality in both the moral and
legal sense, as our commitment to "equality of opportunity"' shifts
its focus from changing social institutions to altering the individual
through genetic manipulation."
The penumbra of privacy enunciated in Griswold v.
Connecticut' derived from reasoning that the "intent of the Bill of
Rights as a whole and hence of the fourteenth amendment, was to
provide an additional bulwark against governmental intrusion on
rights so fundamental that one need not or could not list them."'
276. CONsT TON, supra note 11, at 16. The equal protection clause subjects race and
alienage categorization to strictest level of scrutiny, followed by a somewhat lower level of
scrutiny for gender. Id.
277. Id. at 16-17.
278. Id. at 17. "Science may test the concept of 'equality,' which has left an undefined
postulate of the law." Id. See Murray, supra note 157, at 22. One example of a
constitutional dilemma is the conflict between the concept of equality and technological-based
findings of differences between workers screened by genetic techniques. Id. The
commentator reflects on the potential threat to "vitally important beliefs about political and
moral equality' posed by "scientific knowledge and technical wizardry" emphasizing the
differences among individuals. Id.
279. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 67 n.21. This question has generated concern as to
who will control the new technology. Is it to be left to government or to private enterprise?
280. Id. at 67.
281. Id. at 67-68. The troubling question of how genetic engineering will interface with
equality of opportunity remains unanswered. Id. at 68. This raises a fundamental challenge
to our basic assumption of the "principles of distributive justice" that traditionally are involved
only with the "inequalities in social goods: rather than changing "natural inequalities." Id.
282. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
283. CoNsrrroN, supra note 11, at 17-18; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
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With the advances made in the biological sciences, the scope and
dilemma of personal autonomy will be the subject of much
controversy, as individuals will be faced with the need to make more
decisions about life, death, and reproduction. There may be
constitutional questions revolving around the right of privacy as
technology increases the ability of government to investigate,
monitor, and even "manipulate the behavior of specific individuals."'
The translation of scientific information into public policy
"involves important tensions to which the Constitution speaks."'
Biotechnology has introduced issues calling for the reexamination of
the entire area protected by the Bill of Rights, since technological
progress has given humans the means whereby they can "intervene
where they could not before."'
XIL THE REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
There is general acknowledgment that there is a need for close,
reasonable, and informed regulation of this emerging technology."
One question which arises is whether, as biotechnology moves
from basic research' to applied research' in the commercial world,
284. CONS=rlmON, supra note 11, at 19.
285. Id. at 2. The balancing of risks versus the benefits to be derived from technology has
to be evaluated and judgments made. These judgments will have to be made in terms
compatable with "constitutional values of personal freedom and privacy." Id.
286. Seltzer, supra note 239, at 12. The expanding technologies and the potential powerful
influences exerted on the pattern of American society will require an assessment of the role
the Bill of Rights will play in preventing abusive use by these advanced developments in
science and technology. Id.
287. Thomas, Overview: Regulating Biotechnology, Introduction, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 309
(1985). The public is entitled to, and requires, assurance that the.marketable products of
recombinant DNA being distributed, consumed, or sprayed on open fields or into deep mines,
are "safe and effective." Id. at 313. There is concern about the scientific illiteracy of the
"legal community," as it will be the lawyers who will bear the responsibility for the formation
of the "regulatory laws" and the "mechanisms for judicial and legislative review." Id. at 313-14.
288. Id. Basic research does not provide a product, only new knowledge. Id. at 312. It
starts as an imaginative idea that is based on selective data that is then constructed into a
hypothesis. Id. The next step is experimentation to either prove or disprove the hypothesis.
Id.
289. Id. Applied research capitalizes on the findings of the basic research and proceeds
to develop something that is marketable. Id. See Fost, Regulating Genetic Technology, in
1988] NOTES
the current regulatory program of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) is adequate.' Only federally funded research is obliged to
conform to NIH guidelines." However, private corporations
voluntarily comply with the guidelines because they wish to avoid
public censure, potential legal liability for defective products, and
the loss of insurance coverage.'
The original NIH guidelines for the regulation of DNA
research were promulgated in June 1976.2' They were basically
divided into two sections, administrative and technical. The
administrative area detailed the formation and function of various
overseeing committees, 294  the most authoritative being the
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) which served to
implement the guidelines.' The technical portion of the guidelines
GENETICS III, supra note 2, at 15. Fost notes that the distinction between basic research and
applied research is narrowing. In a period of less than ten years, the biotechnology field has
progressed from the discovery of the technique of recombinant DNA to human application,
to profitable uses. Researchers often "work concurrently in corporate settings and academic
instutions" and sometimes it is difficult to determine whether basic or applied research is
being performed. Id. at 16.
290. Gore & Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POLY REV. 336 (1985).
The guidelines set up by National Institutes Of Health (NIH) and the implementing of those
standards by Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) was "sufficient" when only
laboratory safety was involved. Id. at 343. However, with the progressive commercialization
of biotechnology, it is essential to evaluate the risks involved and how to minimize them
without "unduly burdening the development of technology." Id.
291. Gage, supra note 13, at 211 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HUMAN
GENE THERAPY: A BACKGROUND PAPER 36 (1984)).
292. Gage, supra note 13, at 211. See Discussion in GENETICS III, supra note 2, at 447.
In a discussion on biotechnological concerns, one of the panelists asked whether compliance
with the federal standards would be a defense where injured private individuals bring lawsuits
for damages. Id. In response another participant commented that by analogy to "other areas,
it should be noted that compliance with the government standard would be evidence of due
care, but not necessarily conclusive. It won't be a complete bar to the suit." Id.
293. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,011 (updated as 48 Fed. Reg. 24,556 (1983)).
294. Barkstrom, Recombinant DNA and the Regulation of Biotechnology Reflections On The
Asilomar Conference Ten Years After, 19 AKRON L. REV. 81 (1985) (construing 41 Fed. Reg.
27,920-27 (1976), 48 Fed. Reg. 24,569 (1976)). The administrative portion has been described
as "chain-of-command or committee-upon-committee." Id. at 89. Each NIH funded
institution had to have a policy setting and reviewing board, the Institutional Biohazards
Committee (IBC). Additionally, there were Initial Review Groups which were essentially
study groups. Id.
295. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 89. These groups all reported back to the Recombinant
DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee (RAG). The final decision as to whether to
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contained a list of prohibited experiments such as "deliberate release
into the environment of recombinants, deliberate alterations of
microorganisms with respect to drug resistance, and the deliberate
use of various toxins lethal to vertebrates."'  It also detailed the
four sets of special practices, equipment, and laboratory installations,
that defined the four levels of physical containment to prevent the
escape of the microorganism from the research area.' These four
physical levels ranged from P-1 for experimentation involving
minimal risk, to P-4 for high risk experiments."'
Additionally, this section of the guidelines sets up standards for
biological containment, which is defined as the use of organisms with
limited ability to survive outside of the very special conditions that
are maintained in the laboratory.' Presently, the bacteria most
frequently used is Escherichia Coli (E. Coli), which represents the
lowest of three designated levels of containment.3"
The NIH guidelines have undergone a variety of revisions
because it has been determined that the dangers and risks presented
proceed with a research experiment could then be made by the NIH, based on these reports.
Id.
296. Id. at 89-90. As Barkstrom noted, the toxins that were not permitted to be used in
experiments were, botulism, diptheria, insect and snake venoms. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,914-15
(1976); Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 89-90.
297. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 89. The essential requirement was to insure that
nothing escaped from the laboratory area, but in the event that it did, it would not survive
for any length of time. Id. See also 41 Fed. Reg. 27,912-14 (1983).
298. Talbot, Introduction to Recombinant DNA Research, Development and Evolution of NIH
Guidelines, and Proposed Legislation, 12 U. TOL L. REv. 804 (1981). P1 is lowest level and
corresponds to the standard microbiology hospital laboratory where infectious microorganisms
are grown. P2 adds biological safety cabinets. P3 adds more specialized equipment and the
entire laboratory is operated with an inward air flow. Id. at 808 n.15. All experiments are
conducted in air tight biological safety cabinets, working through glove ports. Id.
299. Id. at 809. The levels range from EK1 for the lowest level of containment to EK3
which is the highest level of containment. Id. These three levels of microorganisms are
modified forms of bacteria, which are made dependent for survival on nutrients supplied by
the laboratory. Id. As these nutrients are not found in nature, the bacteria would not survive
if they happen to escape into the environment. Id. There are also modified forms of bacteria
which have been further modified to become sensitized to sunlight. Id.; see also 41 Fed. Reg.
27,912-14 (1983).
300. 41 Fed. Reg. § 27,912-14 (1983).
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by recombinant DNA are less than was originally feared.0 1 In 1976,
experiments on recombinant DNA were deferred because of the
tremendous amount of possible dangers that would occur if the
containment failed.' However, the most recent set of guidelines,
established in 1983, permits the RAC to allow such releases on a
case by case evaluation. The role of the RAC, under the
modified guidelines, is now perceived as an evolution "from a
containment focused lab safety monitor to a regulator of proposals
for deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms into the
environment."'  Critical appraisal of the NIH guidelines and
authority of the RAC has led to the conclusion that the current
regulatory scheme fails to provide for adequate risk assessment of
the effects of such release.m
The NIH guidelines have never been codified into regulations
and thus provide weak legal authority.' Violation of these
guidelines by NIH funded research institutions may result in the loss
of such funding, but there is no enforcement authority over
301. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 12-13. For the majority of experiments the "opponents
now bear the burden of proving danger, rather than the proponents having to prove safety."
Id. at 13 (footnote ommitted). Although most molecular biologists feel that the fears
originally expressed have been exaggerated, RAC decided in 1982 not to convert the
guidelines into a voluntary code. Id.
302. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,914 (1976). The National Institute of Health listed specific
experiments which could not be initiated in 1976. Id. at 27,914-15.
303. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,556 (1983). Gore & Owens, supra note 290, at 344-45. Under 48
Fed. Reg. 24,548-49 (1983), an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) formed by a private
company' registered with the RAC, would present its proposal for the release of the
experimental microorganism into the environment. The RAC would evaluate the research,
and make a determination as to whether it should be permitted. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,126 (1978).
304. Gore & Owens, supra note 290, at 345. The RAC has proved to be ineffective under
tile NIH guidelines because of the lack of risk assessment procedures, and because the
guidelines are not binding on commercial ventures. Id. at 343. It is feared that because of
the ineffectiveness of the RAC, many commercial firms will not register with the RAC
through the IBCs in order to get approval. Id.
305. Id.
306. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 90. The general belief was that the only legal basis for
their enforcement was derived from contract law. To reenforce the contractual basis, the
funded institution was required to sign an agreement that it would comply with the guidelines.
However, in 1980 this requirement was removed by amendments to the guidelines. See 41
Fed. Reg. 27,921 (1983).
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commercial research.' In response to questions surrounding the
effectiveness of the guidelines and the RAC authority, there has
been some involvement on the part of state and local legislative
bodies.' One of the powers reserved to the states under the tenth
amendment' is the preservation and protection of the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizenry.31 This authority provided the
justification for some localized regulation of genetic engineering.311
Currently, there is little activity under the recombinant DNA laws
or the ordinances enacted by a few jurisdictions."'
Opponents to local control argue that risks generated by
genetic techniques are not subject to geographic limitations and
should be regulated on a central national level, as opposed to the
"random patchwork of confusing and conflicting controls" of the
different states and communities.3 Despite this espousal of federal
control, Congress has failed to enact into law any of the various bills
introduced for the control of biotechnological research.1 4 It has
307. Gore & Owens, supra note 290, at 345 n.41.
308. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 12. The concerns about the dangers of genetic
engineering have generated heated debates on the local community level. Id.
309. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." Id.
310. IMPACTS, supra note 17, at 229.
311. Id. Local and state governments as a rule are more open to public opinion than is
the federal government, and thus assessment of the risks of genetic engineering are likely to
"precisely reflect the will of the segment of the public most directly affected." Id. at 229.
312. Id. at 230. Siveral communities have enacted ordinances for the restriction of genetic
engineering research. In 1977, Cambridge, Massachusetts enacted an ordinance that subjected
researchers to restrictions beyond those set by the RAC guidelines. Id.; Cambridge, Mass.,
Ordinance for the Use of Recombinant DNA Technology in the City of Cambridge 2092
(Apr. 27, 1981). An ordinance passed by Berkley, California required compliance by
researchers to the guidelines. IMPAcrs, supra note 17, at 230; BERKLEY, CAL., HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ch. 12.30, § 12.30.050(B) (1978). In addition, several other cities have enacted
similar legislation. IMPACTS, supra note 17, at 230. Finally, New York passed a
comprehensive statute. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3222(2) (McKinney 1985).
313. IMPACrs, supra note 17, at 229-30. Additionally, it is argued that there is greater
availability of the expertise required for the setting up of reasonable regulations on the
national levels. Id.
314. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 12. The 95th Congress failed to pass the sixteen bills
associated with recombinant DNA research. Id. at 12 n.10. These bills were in addition to
legislation proposed and considered, but never introduced in Congress. Id.
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been suggested that the failure of Congress to curb biotechnology
research is a concession to the members of the scientific community,
who contend that the real risks are small, and the benefits to be
incurred by conquering disease far outweigh any risks, which appear
to be minimal in light of the apparent safety of the research.315
Although there is no specific federal legislation enacted in this
area, any federal statute regarding the environment or having a
relationship to health considerations may impact and interface with
the products of recombinant DNA research.31 Statutes which bear
consideration for possible effectiveness in this sphere include:
(a)The Toxic Substance Control Act3" provides that the manufacture
and use of a substance can be prohibited if there is a reasonable
basis for concluding that its manufacture or use presents an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment.3"8
(b)The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act319 prohibits the
adulteration of food, drugs, and cosmetics.3  Before any
pharmaceutical made by genetic engineering can be distributed for
public use, it must be approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).32 Further, it can require compliance with
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP).32
315. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 93. This author notes that when there is a question
regarding the interpretation of a statute, the courts look to legislative history for congressional
intent. Id. Recombinant DNA legislative history indicates the clear intent of Congress not
to legislate recombinant DNA as a distinct technology. Id.
316. Id.
317. 15. U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1982).
318. Id. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 93.
319. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 346, 351 (1982).
320. Id. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 93.
321. IMPACTS, supra note 17, at 225. Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982) a new drug is
defined as "any drug ... the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience ... and ... as safe
and effective . . . . " Id.
322. 21 U.S.C. § 351 (1982). Under this statute Good Manufacturing Practices establish
general guidelines which include personnel qualifications, process controls, the condition of
the facilities, and general principles for maintaining sanitation. Id. The GMP regulations do
not make any distinction between firms using the new biotechnology and those using the
traditional manufacturing procedures. Id.
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(c)The Public Health Service Act3' enables the Surgeon General to
set up regulations when necessary to prevent the spread of
communicable diseases.3"
(d)The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act3' allows
the Environmental Protection Agency' to refuse registration, a
prerequisite to distribution and sale of microbial agents used as
pesticides, only if there are unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment.327
All four statutes provide some measure of control. However,
absent clear evidence of danger inherent in recombinant DNA
derived products or technology, there is little likelihood of
regulatory action by the administrative agents of these acts.3'
323. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
324. Id. IMPACTS, supra note 17, at 227. The Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS) has the broad authority to "make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are
necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases." Id.
Because the Secretary has such wide discretionary powers, it was felt that § 361 of this Act
could control all recombinant DNA activities. Id. However, HHS refused to make any
regulations respecting this technology. The Secretary questioned the validity of any such
regulations since that a connection between the genetically engineered product and human
disease would first have to be shown. Id.
325. 7 U.S.C § 136a(c)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
326. IMPACS, supra note 17, at 226. The substances subject to this act are excluded from
the definition of chemical substance of the Toxic Substance Control Act. A chemical
substance is defined as "any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity,"
including "any combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a
chemical reaction or occurring in nature." Toxic Substance Control Act, § 3(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2602(2)(a) (1976). The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency disagreed
with the exclusion of biologicals such as yeast, bacteria and fungi. IMPACrS, supra note 17,
at 226 (footnote ommitted). He stated that the definition of chemical substances should refer
to life forms manufactured for commercial purposes. Id.
327. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 94.
328. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 94. Other acts have some impact on genetic regulation:
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-12 (1982 & Supp. III 1985);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 416-466(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Marine Sanctuaries Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-39 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Resource Conservation & Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982
& Supp. I1 1985); Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-642 (1982 & Supp. II 1985);
Department of Agriculture has jurisdiction: Processed Products Inspection Improvements Act,
21 U.S.C. §§ 601-95 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Poultry Product Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
451-69 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031-56 (1982);
Virus-Serum-Toxin Act 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (applies only to
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Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),32 the
Secretary of Labor is empowered to require that employers provide
a safe workplace for their employees, free of hazards likely to cause
death or injury. The research division of OSHA has been studying
recombinant DNA production procedures to evaluate the risks to
which employees in the biotechnology industry will be exposed.33
This Act cannot control the manufacture of genetic material unless
a definite and specific hazard can be identified.332
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)333 requires that
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)3" be filed for all federally
funded research. One of the more vocal activists opposing DNA
research initiated a law suit based on a failure by NIH to file an
Environmental Impact Statement to prevent an experiment which
would have released a genetically engineered bacteria into the
atmosphere.335
treatment of domestic animals).
329. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1985).
330. IMPACTs, supra note 17, at 225.
331. SPUCING LIFE, supra note 1, at 102. The National Institutes for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) has established guidelines for the medical surveillance of workers who
have been exposed to this kind of work environment, involved with recombinant DNA
industrial processes. Id. Additionally, NIOSH is researching the best means for "future
control in the use of recombinant organisms." Id. at 102.
332. IMPACrs, supra note 17, at 225 (citing Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), in which the Supreme Court established that the basis
for promulgation of a standard exists only when it is determined that it is "reasonably
necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment." Id.
This restrictive requirement, limiting the Act's authority to "significant risks," would prevent
any control over manufacturing where genetic procedures "presented only hypothetical risks."
Id.).
333. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
334. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). An Environmental Impact Statement is required prior
to final approval of all "major Federal actions significatly affecting the quality of the human
environment." Id.
335. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984). Jeremy
Rifkin, as representative of his organization, the Foundation on Economic Trends, initiated
a suit to enjoin the scientists at the University of California from proceeding with a field test
on a potato patch. Id. at 754. The potato plant was to release this genetically engineered
bacteria onto this area. Id. at 755-56. The release had been approved by the RAC. Id. The
bacteria, commonly found in potato fields, normally has the capacity to facilitate the
formation of frost, thereby damaging the potato crop when the temperature dropped close
to freezing. The genetically manufactured bacteria did not contain the protein which
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The Asilomar Conference of 1973, convened by scientists
concerned about the new recombinant DNA technology, voted to
impose a moratorium on all experimentation until there was
assurance that the work could proceed safely.3" The great success
experienced and the accelerated pace at which recombinant DNA
technology has progressed, without any dire mishaps, have tended to
allay the fears and doubts originally expressed by the molecular
biologists meeting in Asilomar. 37 Despite this consensual optimism,
there are some scientists who advocate continued caution since "it
has not been demonstrated that recombinant DNA technology is
either benign or without danger.""as The present inadequacy of a
accelerates the frost, and it was anticipated that the potatoes would b'e able to withstand a
few extra degrees of temperature. Id. The RAC neglected to issue an Environmental Impact
Statement, as required by law. Id. at 755. The district court ruled that the RAC had violated
the NEPA act by its failure to require an Environmental Impact Statement for an approved
release of genetically engineered bacteria. Id. at 767-68. The decision questioned the legality
of the entire RAC review process, noting that:
On the basis of the Director's 1978 comments, therefore, the court must conclude
that the 'standard' for granting a waiver can only be described as whatever it takes
to win the confidence of, hopefully, at least a majority of the RAC and the
subsequent approval of the Director of NIH.
Id. at 760.
The court of appeals in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 657 F.2d 143 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) did uphold the district court's injunction against the release of the experimental
bacteria, but it lifted the district court's injunction against RAC approval of any application
for release into the environment of experimental products. Id. at 158.
336. Barkstrom, supra note 294, at 81. The International Conference on Recombinant DNA
Molecules was held at the Asilomar Conference Center in Pacific Grove, California, in
February 1973. Id. It was at this meeting of leading scientists in the field of molecular
biology and allied disciplines that a moratorium was put on all research in genetic engineering
until proper guidelines could be drawn up. Id. That conference was born out of the
uncertainty of what this new technology could do. Now, more than a decade later, the fears
have been dissipated to a great extent. Id.
337. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 1, at 11-13. The fact that there have been no incidents of
physical injuries resulting from the genetically engineered organisms has made most molecular
biologists feel that there is little risk. Id. at 13.
338. Ozonoff, Just When You Thought it was Safe: An Update on the Risks of Recombinant
DNA Technology, in GENEmcs III, supra note 2, at 467. The main thesis of the author is the
doubt he feels about the "seriousness and thoroughness with which we have evaluated the risks
of this technology." Id. One commentator has asked, "[iun the case of recombinant DNA,
do the intial warnings by scientists of possible disasters from mishaps have continuing force
once the same scientists suggest that subsequent experiments has led them to doubt that any
unusual risk exists?" Id. at 13.
NOTES
regulatory structure for genetic technique has led one scientist to
comment on the importance of treating "any powerful technology
with the greatest respect for the harm it can do."339
XIL CONCLUSION
We are entering into a new scientific era in which the lives and
future of most Americans will be shaped as a result of this new
technology. Now that science and technology have provided us with
the key to open up the secret of the double helix, it is hoped that
the new knowledge we have acquired will be used for the benefit of
all and will not be abused. Reasoned assessments of the balance
between the benefits and risks will have to be made.
Benefits bestowed by this newly acquired ability for
manipulation of genetic material have already been demonstrated in
the medical field, by the production of various drugs and biologics,
and the identification and treatment of serious diseases by new
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. The program for mapping
the human genome has introduced a revolutionary concept in
diagnostic techniques, giving medical researchers the capability to
determine an individual's likelihood of contracting an illness before
there are any clinical manifestations. The positive aspect of this
technique is the promise of freedom from genetically caused
diseases. The accompanying unfortunate consequence is the
question of invasion of privacy and the exercise of free choice. In
the area of prenatal diagnosis, genetic counseling will play an ever
increasing role, thereby exposing the medical practitioner to
potential liability for failure to provide information upon which
informed consent decisions could be made.
The problem of property rights in biotechnology inventions is
still an open question. Researchers and industrial concerns in the
field of biotechnology are constitutionally entitled to patent
339. Id. at 473. His concern for the absence of any "regulatory framework" to control all
forms of genetic manipulative techniques has led him to say that "[i]t serves neither the
interests of science nor the public interest to mythologize the past and to blind ourselves to
the dangers of the present." Id.
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protection for their inventions. Also, the need for changes in the
patent and trade secret laws will have to be evaluated in light of the
claims of cell donors to be included as participants in the research
process.
Further areas to be addressed in the benefit/risk balancing
analysis are the environmental impacts of the release of genetically
engineered microbes into the environment, constitutional challenges
presented by technology, and the extent and scope of governmental
regulation.
Education of the public and open discussion on the
fundamental issues evolving from the pursuit of genetic information
and technology must be a prime objective. An informed public must
work together with the scientific community and governmental
representatives to protect the future from the unwise judgments and
actions of today. Attainment of this goal depends on recognition of
"the necessity of support for basic research from all major partners -
government, academia, and industry - and, concomitantly, the
indispensable need for circumspection and public oversight in the
applications of this technology to humans and the environment."'
It is incumbent upon all of us to face the moral, ethical, and
legal dilemmas in the context of the fundamental value, dignity, and
inherent rights of the individual human being.
Penina P. Wollman
340. Perpich, The Biotechnology Industy: Impact of Federal Research and Regulatory Policies,
in GENerics III, supra note 2, at 413, 422. The new genetic engineering industry is the result
of the combination of the "skills of academic research scientists, the fruits of federally funded
basic research, and the venture capitalists' dollars." Id. at 414.
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